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version of Chevron would also allow more precise calibration of the level of judicial deference
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CHEVRON AS A VOTING RULE
INTRODUCTION
Of central importance to administrative law and theory is the question of
whether, and when, courts will defer to agency interpretations of law. In
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' the Supreme
Court replaced earlier answers to that question with a new framework: courts
should defer to an agency interpretation unless the relevant statute is clear or
the agency interpretation is unreasonable. In the past two decades, however,
the Chevron framework has come under increasing strain. Doctrinally, there are
many ambiguities and uncertainties about the nature of the inquiry at the first
and second steps of Chevron, including questions about the admissibility and
weight of various legal sources.2 In practice, recent evidence suggests that
Chevron's effect varies markedly with the ideological and political preferences
of the judges who apply it.3
In what follows, we will suggest that these problems arise, in part, from a
dubious premise of the Chevron enterprise, one that should be rethought. The
dubious premise is that the legal system should adopt a doctrinal solution -the
Chevron rule-for what is, after all, an institutional problem: the allocation of
interpretive authority between agencies and courts when congressional
instructions are absent or ambiguous. We explore an alternative, which is to
cast Chevron as a voting rule, thereby institutionalizing deference to
administrative agencies. The precise details of the voting rule might vary, and
we will discuss different versions. To motivate the discussion, however,
imagine a voting rule stating that when a litigant challenges agency action as
inconsistent with an organic statute, the agency will prevail unless the judges,
asking simply what the best interpretation of the statute is, vote to overturn the
agency by supermajority vote- say, by a 6-3 vote on the Supreme Court, or by
a 3-0 vote on a court of appeals panel.
Our thesis is that a voting rule of this sort would capture the benefits of the
doctrinal version of Chevron while generating fewer costs. In the doctrinal
version, judges must develop and internalize a legal distinction between the
best interpretation of the statute and a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. For an overview of the doctrinal puzzles, see STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 319-413 (5th ed. 2002).
3. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Thomas J. Miles &
Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?: An Empirical Investigation of Chevron,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (20o6); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997).
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For conceptual, psychological, and motivational reasons, this distinction is
tenuous, even unstable. This should be unsurprising; the doctrinal solution
requires judges to internalize a legal norm of deference, but it is accompanied
by none of the traditional mechanisms that law uses to force decision-makers
to internalize the consequences of their choices. Conversely, the principal
advantage of institutionalizing Chevron as a voting rule is that it makes agency
deference an aggregate property that arises from the whole set of votes, rather
than an internal component of the decision rules used by individual judges.
Casting Chevron as a voting rule has other benefits as well. A voting-rule
version of Chevron would allow more precise calibration of the level of judicial
deference over time, and, holding the level of deference constant, a voting rule
of agency deference would produce less variance in deference across courts and
over time, yielding a lower level of legal uncertainty than does the doctrinal
version of Chevron.
We begin, in Part I, by laying out a distinction between legal doctrine and
institutional rules. Part II explains the benefits of casting Chevron as a voting
rule, while Part III examines the costs. Part II suggests that recasting Chevron
as a voting rule would produce three major benefits: it would make agency
deference an aggregate property of a multi-member panel's vote rather than a
legal norm to be internalized by individual judges; it would allow more precise
calibration of the level of agency deference and greater fine-tuning of the areas
in which deference is to apply; and it would reduce the legal uncertainty that
currently arises from the complexities of the Chevron framework. Part III turns
to costs. We examine objections based on May's Theorem and the Jury
Theorem; the problems of single-member courts; the uncertainty of the voting
rule's triggering conditions; the effects of judicial precedent on agency
flexibility; the costs of decision-making; the possibility of strategic behavior;
the loss of positive byproducts of the doctrinal solution; and the unlikelihood
that any institution would supply such a rule. Many of these objections,
however, apply with equal force to the doctrinal version of Chevron; the rest are
unpersuasive or irrelevant on their own terms.
I. LEGAL DOCTRINE AND INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
A. Problems, Soft Solutions, and Hard Solutions
In many domains, legal doctrine is developed by judges, lawyers, and
commentators to solve institutional problems -for example, the allocation of
power across different institutions or among different officials within the same
68o
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institution. Thus the presumption of constitutionality for legislation allocates a
measure of interpretive authority over the Constitution to legislatures;4 the
"clear error" standard of review allocates fact-finding competence to trial
courts;5 and the legal norm of precedent or stare decisis allocates decision-
making authority from present judges to past judges, whose views control the
judgment of the present on some questions.
But legal doctrine is rarely the only possible solution to institutional
deference problems, and it is not always the best solution. An alternative is to
change the rules that govern the composition, powers, or voting mechanisms
of the relevant institutions. We call these "hard" solutions, in contrast to "soft"
doctrinal solutions. The relative costs and benefits of soft and hard solutions
vary across contexts and over time. Our point is not that hard solutions are
always superior, for they are not. What we do suggest is that hard solutions
prove superior in many domains yet are frequently overlooked by lawyers.
We consider here some examples of legal problems for which there is an
important choice between soft and hard solutions. For manageability, and to
hew closely to the Chevron issue, we confine ourselves to the choice between
legal doctrine and voting rules, rather than other sorts of hard solutions.
1. Deference to Legislatures
The presumption of constitutionality for legislation, according to which
courts should uphold legislation if there is a reasonable argument for its
constitutionality, was advocated by James Bradley Thayer and many later
judges and commentators, including Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix
Frankfurter and Judge Learned Hand.6 The strength of the doctrinal
presumption, however, has waxed and waned over the course of American
constitutional history. Today, many believe that the presumption has withered
away, particularly in certain contexts.7 A hard alternative periodically surfaces
4. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); James Bradley Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
5. For a recent overview of the clear error standard and related issues, see Randall H. Warner,
All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101 (2005).
6. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 661-62 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 567-68 (1923) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Fairbank
v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 285 (1901) (Brewer, J.); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RiGHTS
56 (1958); Thayer, supra note 4; see also GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND
THE JUDGE 121 (1994). See generally Wallace Mendelson, The Influence ofJames B. Thayer upon
the Work of Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1978).
7. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704-05 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
681
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in the form of proposals that the Supreme Court, and perhaps lower courts,
should use (or be required to use) a supermajority rule to invalidate statutes on
constitutional grounds.8 A voting rule of this sort would build Thayerian
deference into judicial decision-making at the aggregate level of the whole
court, rather than urge individual judges to internalize deference as a legal
norm.
2. Precedent
Just as judges might defer to legislatures when there is reasonable doubt
about legal questions, so too judges might and do defer to past judges when
there is reasonable doubt about legal issues. The doctrine of stare decisis has
many formulations and complexities, but a simple version requires judges to
follow horizontal precedent - the previous decisions of the same court - unless
the precedent is clearly erroneous.9 This is a soft solution; a hard alternative
would be to say that the precedent decision must be followed unless overruled
by a supermajority vote or even a unanimous vote of the later court.
3. The Rule of Four
The previous examples involved legal norms that have been embodied in
doctrine but that might also be embodied in voting rules, with a different set of
costs and benefits. Here we provide the converse example: a voting rule that
might be recast as a legal doctrine. Consider the Rule of Four, according to
which the votes of any four of the nine Supreme Court Justices are sufficient to
grant certiorari for a full hearing on the merits of a case.1" A soft analogue of
the Rule of Four would be an ordinary majority vote on the decision to grant
certiorari, accompanied by an internalized legal norm that Justices would
follow in casting their individual votes." The content of the internalized norm
8. See Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority
Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73 (2003); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three
Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REv. 893 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 304 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that divergence from precedent is justified only when the prior
judgment was "egregiously incorrect").
1o. See Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U.
PA. L. REv. lO67 (1988).
ii. Cf Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 418-20
(2004) (describing how individual Justices develop a subjective "feel" for cases that are good
candidates for Supreme Court review).
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might be something along the following lines: Justices should vote for
certiorari if a reasonable Justice could believe that the petition warrants a full
hearing. Whatever its precise content, the internalized norm might yield
roughly the same number of certiorari grants, all else being equal, as a
nonmajority voting rule under which each Justice directly asks whether, in his
or her judgment, the Court's criteria for granting certiorari are satisfied.
4. Appointments and Senatorial Deference
So far the examples have focused on courts, but the distinction between
hard and soft rules is relevant to other institutional contexts as well. Doctrinal
norms exist outside of courts; many institutions have more or less explicit
systems of precedent and more or less canonical verbal formulations of norms
that are embodied in the institutions' past decisions. Consider the view, often
advanced by senators of both parties, that the Senate should give some degree
of deference to the President's appointments, especially for executive offices
but for judges as well.'2 The level of deference is hard to capture in any single
verbal formula, but many senators say they will defer unless a nominee is
"clearly" unsuitable. More recently, a decisive fraction of the Senate-the
"Gang of Fourteen" - agreed to defeat filibusters unless "extraordinary
circumstances" exist.'3  One might imagine a system of presidential
appointments that embodied these ideas in a hard voting rule, something like a
reverse filibuster: unless a supermajority votes to defeat a nominee, the
appointment will be deemed confirmed. It is hardly clear that such a rule
would be constitutional, because the best reading of the Advice and Consent
Clause might be that an affirmative majority vote is necessary to approve a
nominee (whether or not it is sufficient to do so). For present purposes, it is
irrelevant whether the hard solution would indeed be constitutionally
permissible; as a conceptual matter it is an entirely viable alternative to the soft
norm of deference to the President.
14
12. See David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
Process, lOl YALE L.J. 1491 (1992).
13. Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, A Last-Minute Deal on Judicial Nominees: Senators
Agree on Votes for 3; 2 Could Still Face Filibusters, WASH. POST, May 24, 2005, at Ai; Charles
Babington & Susan Schmidt, Filibuster Deal Puts Democrats in a Bind: Pact May Hinder Efforts
To Block High Court Nominee, WASH. POST, July 4, 2005, at Ai.
14. As another suggestive example, in Congress the floor gives a soft form of deference to the
proposing committee. See Daniel Diermeier, Commitment, Deference, and Legislative
Institutions, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 344, 344 (1995); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast,
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 85, 85 (1987).
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These examples could easily be multiplied. The central point is that the
bare specification of a problem in the legal system does not entail that the
solution should be doctrinal, rather than institutional in a hard sense. Lawyers
frequently overlook this choice among solutions, perhaps because their training
focuses on legal doctrine and because some hard solutions can only be supplied
by nonjudicial institutions-as when a statute or constitutional amendment is
necessary to change voting rules. We return to the supply-side issues in Part
III. As a general matter, hard solutions are not the dominant solution, but they
are not rare either.
B. General Tradeoffs
With these examples in hand, we are in a position to say something about
the general tradeoffs that determine the choice between soft and hard
solutions. Here we indicate some frequently encountered variables, together
with a rough estimate of their signs. The magnitude of the relevant variables,
however, will differ greatly across contexts, and often there will be special
considerations that do not generalize. These qualifications notwithstanding,
there are regularities that make some tentative generalizations possible.
i. Aggregate Norms Versus Individual Norms
Consider the problem of partial deference, by which we mean the recurring
situation in which it would be good or right for institution A to defer to
institution B but only if institution B's decision is not clearly wrong or
unreasonable. Institution A might be a court, and institution B an agency (or a
legislature); A might be a higher court, and B a lower court; and so on. We
bracket, for now, the question of why deference would be good or right in this
situation; our focus is on the choice of means for attaining a posited goal, not
on the theory that makes the goal desirable. We also assume that institution A
is a multi-member decision-making body, such as an appellate court. Single-
member bodies like district courts present distinct problems, and in any event
single-member bodies rarely make final decisions in our legal system.' I
A problem that arises in many situations of partial deference is that the
triggering conditions for deference are vague or imprecise. What is "clear" or
"unreasonable" to one judge is not "clear" or "unreasonable" to another.
15. We discuss the problem of district courts at greater length infra Section III.B. For a useful if
somewhat dated discussion of district court resolution of administrative law questions, see
David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest
for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1975).
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Conceptually, it is not clear what "clear" means. Psychologically, it may be
difficult for judges and other decision-makers to avoid collapsing their
conception of a reasonable legal answer into their conception of the best legal
answer, thereby defining all second-best answers as unreasonable.
Motivationally, deference rules based on vague triggering conditions allow
scope for ideological and even partisan biases. We return to these points below,
with specific illustrations from administrative law. The basic problem in such
cases is that individual decision-makers are charged with internalizing a legal
norm of deference that is conceptually ill defined and that cuts against both
their individual judgments of what is best and their biases and prejudices. And
this duty of internalization is not aided by any of the usual mechanisms by
which law encourages or forces actors to internalize legal rules, principally
material rewards or penalties. The rewards and sanctions that affect judicial
behavior are weak, second-order forces like professional reputation."
Moreover, vague triggering conditions for deference make it more difficult to
monitor and therefore sanction deviations. Of course legal doctrine requires
judges to internalize norms in many settings, but the burden of internalization
is especially heavy when judges are required to make second-order judgments
about deference, as we illustrate below.
A shift from a soft legal norm to a hard institutional solution would help
solve these problems. Imagine a supermajority voting rule under which
institution A defers to institution B unless two-thirds of the members of A
believe that B is wrong on the merits. Each decision-maker asks simply what
legal answer is best and votes accordingly. Deference is an emergent property
of the aggregate vote, rather than of individual decisions. Conceptually, there is
no need for decision-makers to develop a theory about what counts as a "clear"
(as opposed to merely correct or incorrect) legal answer. Psychologically, there
is no requirement that the decision-maker simultaneously hold in her mind
two conflicting legal standards, so the cognitive load is greatly reduced.
Motivationally, each judge may be biased or prejudiced in some sense, yet
assuming some diversity of preferences the biases will be washed out at the
aggregate level, with deference enforced by the voting rule. Moreover, it is
easier for voters or other principals to monitor the behavior of their agents, the
decision-makers in institution A, because those agents have less room to
maneuver in a supermajority voting-rule system. Instead of concealing their
16. See Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 941, 970-72 (1995); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 813, 825-26 (1998); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and justices Maximize? (The
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5-7 (1993); Frederick Schauer,
Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV.
615, 629-31 (2000).
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biased votes by claiming that institution B's decision is or is not clearly wrong
or unreasonable -claims whose second-order character makes them inherently
costly for outside observers to evaluate -the decision-makers must now simply
state their understanding of the correct legal answer. There is one fewer degree
of freedom for bias to operate.
These points abstract from the level of deference that actually results from
either the soft or hard solution. It is an empirical question whether or not a 6-3
supermajority rule on a nine-member court produces more, less, or the same
level of deference as an internalized legal norm of deference. Holding constant
the level of deference, our suggestion is that a shift from deference as an
internalized norm to deference as an aggregate property can produce a given
level of deference at lower total cost to decision-makers themselves and to other
actors in the system.
2. Calibration Versus Fuzziness
Suppose that an internalized norm of deference produces too much or too
little deference from institution A to institution B, with "too much" or "too
little" defined by some extrinsic theory. 17 How can the level of deference be
adjusted up or down? If a soft solution is in place, adjustment is difficult and
imprecise. Verbal formulae are typically too crude to capture the fine shades of
difference that are needed to tweak deference rules in either direction. As Judge
Richard Posner suggests, "[T]he cognitive limitations that judges share with
other mortals may constitute an insuperable obstacle to making distinctions
any finer than that of plenary versus deferential review." 8 Legal language can
capture the idea of the best legal answer and can indicate the idea of deference
when decisions under review are not clearly erroneous, subject to the problems
we have discussed. More fine-grained standards of deference, however, are
17. Others have urged or implied that Chevron produces too high or too low a probability of
overturning final agency decisions. Compare Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989) (too low),
Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern
Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2000) (too low),
and Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990)
(too low), with Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DuKE L.J. 1385 (1992) (too high), Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath:
Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 3o8-14
(1988) (too high), and Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications
of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLuM. L.
REV. 1093 (1987) (too high).
is. Sch. Dist. v. Z.S. ex rel. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2002).
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difficult to express; cognitive capacities are typically inadequate to sustain a
fine-grained schema of deference standards.'" Administrative law is replete
with arguments about the possible differences between different standards of
review, such as clear error, substantial evidence, and so on.2" Such arguments
are, for the most part, unilluminating. These crude attempts at distinction
often collapse in practice,2" as we illustrate in detail below.
A voting rule can be more precisely calibrated. If a 6-3 supermajority rule
produces too little deference, a 7-2 rule can be substituted. If a submajority rule
such as the Rule of Four produces too few grants of certiorari, a Rule of Three
might be adopted instead. The calibration will still be imperfect because voting
rules remain slightly lumpy; perhaps the optimal level of deference, according
to the extrinsic theory, lies just in between the level produced by a 6-3 rule and
that produced by a 7-2 rule. Comparatively, however, adjustments in voting
rules will be less lumpy, and more fine-grained, than slight manipulations in
the wording of judicial doctrine.
3. Certainty Versus Variance
A corollary of the last point is that hard solutions generally increase legal
certainty. Suppose that a particular doctrinal formulation produces a particular
level of deference, D. This level is a kind of expected value, with variance
around that value. Some courts applying the doctrine will exceed D; some will
fall short; and some courts will exceed D in one period while falling short in
another period. A voting rule will produce greater certainty about deference,
holding constant the expected level of deference. To the extent that reducing
variance is a benefit for actors in the legal system, a voting rule may be
preferable to a doctrinal solution.
In part, this is a result of the calibration point. A single judge will over time
likely produce different degrees of deference, as will multiple judges within the
same time period. Variation in individual-level deference translates into
confusion about the overall level of deference. By making deference a
characteristic of the aggregation mechanism, the voting rule removes this
source of uncertainty. Beyond the calibration point, as long as a voting rule
that builds in deference is more difficult for any intentionally biased judges to
thwart, there will be greater certainty that deference will be applied. For
19. United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 423 (7 th Cir. 199o) (Posner, J., concurring).
2o. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
21. See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 Wm. & MARY L.
REV. 679, 682-85 (2002).
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reasons relating to clarity, predictability, and stability, the voting rule generates
greater certainty.
II. CHEVRON AS A VOTING RULE
So far we have proceeded abstractly. We now turn to Chevron, its problems,
and the choice between hard and soft solutions. Section A sets out the basics of
Chevron's doctrine and rationales, explains that Chevron's most distinctive
innovation relative to pre-Chevron law is to require judges to develop a theory
of permissible interpretation rather than to choose the best interpretation, and
sets out the possible deference regimes that we will compare. Section B
examines three benefits of aggregating judgments through a voting rule. A
voting rule sidesteps conceptual problems that arise under the doctrinal version
of Chevron, ameliorates the psychological difficulties of Chevron deference, and
reduces the scope for political or ideological bias. Sections C and D discuss
calibration and certainty, respectively.
A. Chevron Rudiments
1. Rules and Rationales
Chevron sets out a framework for judicial review of agencies' statutory
interpretations. At Step One of Chevron, judges ask whether the statute speaks
to the "precise question at issue"; if so, then the judges simply enforce its
commands.' If the statute contains a gap - if it is silent on or ambiguous about
the relevant question -then judges are to proceed to Step Two, at which they
ask whether the agency interpretation of the statute is "reasonable," that is,
whether the agency interpretation falls within the scope of the statute's
ambiguity.
2 3
Chevron's theoretical rationale is unclear. In the important United States v.
Mead Corp. decision, 4 the Court, following preexisting commentary,2"
22. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). There
are many subtle problems with Step One, which we do not attempt to review here. For a
comprehensive treatment, see Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 55
(John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005).
23. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
24. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
25. See id. at 230 n.n1 (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001)).
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suggested that Chevron rests on Congress's implicit delegation of law-
interpreting authority to agencies. On this view, Chevron's global default rule-
namely, that statutory silence or ambiguity confers law-interpreting authority
on agencies -derives from an implicit general instruction by Congress. As both
Justices and commentators have noted, however, this rationale is a fiction.2
6
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which is the closest Congress has
come to providing a general instruction on the allocation of law-interpreting
authority, says that courts are to decide all relevant questions of law.27
Some scholars argue that deference to agencies could itself be among the
legal rules that courts are to apply. 8 Even if true, that argument still provides
no affirmative evidence whatsoever that Congress intended to enact (in the
APA or elsewhere) a general meta-instruction that courts treat statutory silence
or ambiguity as a delegation of law-interpreting authority to agencies.29 The
implied-delegation rationale for Chevron risks treating Congress as a
ventriloquist's dummy, into whose mouth may be inserted whatever fictional
legal meta-instructions are necessary to square agency deference with the
conviction that courts must say what the law is.
The Chevron opinion itself did not adopt this approach. In a crucial
passage, the Court explicitly rejected the idea that statutory gaps necessarily
represent a congressional meta-instruction to delegate law-interpreting
authority to the agency:
Congress intended to accommodate both [economic and
environmental] interests, but did not do so itself on the level of
specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body consciously
desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking
that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so;
26. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 370 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517.
27. 5 U.S.C. S 706 (2000) ("To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law .... ").
28. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25-
28 (1983).
29. We bracket here the claim that a well-understood legal convention, which later vanished
from view, made a statutory grant of rulemaking authority, coupled with a statutory
provision imposing sanctions for violating agency rules, equivalent to a delegation of
authority to agencies to make rules with the force of law, and thus gave agencies law-
interpreting authority. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with
the Force of Law: The Original Convention, i16 HARv. L. REV. 467 (2002).
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perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and
perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the
question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the
scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which
of these things occurred.
3°
On this picture, a congressional meta-instruction might exist (as in the first
scenario the Court gave) or it might not (as in the second or third scenarios),
but the issue of whether it does exist lacks the dispositive importance that later
commentators have tried to give it.3 ' The real basis for agency deference,
according to the Chevron opinion itself, was not an implicit congressional meta-
instruction but a candid recognition by judges of the limits of their own
institutional capacities: "Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of
either political branch of Government. '32 Agencies' superior expertise and
political accountability better position them to fill statutory gaps.
It might be said that these two components of Chevron's rationale are in
tension with each other because political accountability distorts expertise, but
this overlooks two points. First, when statutes contain gaps, the executive may
pursue either a technocratic course or a political one; on the logic of Chevron,
either approach is permissible.33 Second, Chevron's claim is a strictly
comparative one about the relative institutional capacities of agencies and
courts. By analogy, even if speed and power trade off against one another at the
outer margins of athletic performance, still one baseball player might be both
speedier and more powerful than another. So too, even if there is a marginal
tradeoff between expertise and political accountability, agencies might be both
systematically more expert and systematically more accountable than generalist
judges.
2. Permissible Interpretations and Best Readings
For present purposes, the most important feature of Chevron is that -in the
doctrinal version-it requires an individual judge to develop a theory of
reasonable or permissible interpretation, distinct from her theory of what
interpretation is best. Under pre-Chevron doctrine, many decisions suggested
30. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (emphasis
added).
31. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 25.
32. 467 U.S. at 865.
33. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say What the Law Is, 115
YALE L.J. 2580, 2588 (2006).
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that the judicial task is to identify the statute's "meaning" or best reading.34
This is the standard conception of the judicial task when no agency is in the
picture, or when the relevant agency does not receive deference at all-as in
criminal cases, in which the nominal rule is that judges do not defer to
prosecutors' legal interpretations. To be sure, judges seeking the best legal
answer might take agency interpretations as persuasive guidance, depending
upon the agency's accumulated experience, "the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control."3 Yet, in principle, these are just helpful pointers to
the best interpretation.
Chevron departs from this baseline in a crucial respect. Under the doctrinal
version of Chevron, the judge must be able to say or think, in some set of cases,
that the agency's interpretation of a statute is "reasonable" or "permissible,"
even though it is not the one the judge herself would deem best were her law-
interpreting authority to be exercised de novo. The judge must, in effect, add
to her first-order theory of statutory interpretation a second-order theory that
identifies some first-order interpretations as reasonable, whether or not they
are correct.
The point of this innovation is to open up space for discretionary policy
judgments by agencies. Chevron does this by distinguishing between judges'
views about a statute's best reading, on the one hand, and a range of
permissible agency interpretations, on the other. Instead of an interpretation
that is a "point estimate," Chevron aims to open up a "policy space" that gives
agencies breathing room to pursue policies based on technocratic judgments or
democratic politics. 6 We will take this goal as given, putting aside root-and-
branch criticisms of Chevron based on the separation of powers.37 Chevron's
second-order approach to interpretation, however, has proven problematic on
conceptual, psychological, and motivational grounds. Our basic claim is that
there is a better way to achieve Chevron's goals. Agencies should be given
breathing room by means of voting rules rather than legal doctrine.
Chevron's requirement of a theory of permissible interpretation, as distinct
from a theory of the best interpretation, implicates Step One of Chevron as well
as Step Two. At Step One, the logic of Chevron does not permit the judge
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120-23 (1944).
35. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
36. E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress,
Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 ViLL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11-12 (2005); see Sunstein,
supra note 33, at 2599.
37. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 17.
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simply to ask what the best interpretation of the statute is, by her lights, and
then pronounce the statute "clear." (To be sure, some decisions do seem to
adopt this course, as we will see, but these are failures of the Chevron
framework, not examples of its successful operation.) Rather, the Step One
inquiry asks whether the agency interpretation, even if not the one the judge
would deem best in a de novo consideration, is or is not clearly ruled out by the
statute. Step One contemplates that the judge, viewing all relevant legal
materials, will in some cases conclude that (1) the best reading of the statute is
X rather than Y, but also that (2) the statute does not clearly mandate X rather
than Y. The latter possibility makes a theory of permissible interpretation
necessary at Step One as well as at Step Two. And as we will see, the need for a
second-order theory of this kind gives rise to a range of distinctive problems.
3. Deference Regimes
We have mentioned two different distinctions: de novo judicial
interpretation, on the one hand, versus Chevron doctrine, on the other; and
majority rule, on the one hand, versus supermajority rule, on the other.
Combining these two distinctions, four deference regimes are possible.
(i) De novo judicial interpretation with a majority rule. This is a regime of no
deference at all. Before Chevron, many cases suggested that this was the law,
although there were contrary decisions as well."s Starting from this baseline,
there are two ways to push the law toward greater deference: by adopting a
legal doctrine of deference and by adopting a voting rule weighted in the
agency's favor. We take up these possibilities in turn.
(2) Chevron with a majority rule. This is the solution the Court adopted in
1984. In our terms, it is a soft rather than a hard solution. We suggest below
that this solution produces a range of costs and problems that might be
avoided by adopting a hard solution instead. Of course, if (1) and (2) were the
only options, (2) might well be thought preferable.39 But we will argue that a
different regime is better still.
(3) De novo judicial interpretation with a supermajority rule (weighted in favor
of agency interpretations). This is the regime we denote by the label "Chevron as a
38. Compare Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130-31 (suggesting de novo judicial interpretation of pure
questions of law), with Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941) (suggesting judicial
deference to agency interpretations), and Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S.
125, 145-46 (1939) (same).
39. One of us has argued as much. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 205-29 (2006) (arguing for strong
Chevron deference, while holding voting rules constant).
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voting rule"; our suggestion is that it is superior to (2) because it captures the
benefits of (2) at lower cost. Starting from the current regime-Chevron
combined with majority rule -a move to Chevron as a voting rule requires two
legal changes, not just one. Both the legal standard and the voting rule must be
changed; the former by abolishing Chevron doctrine in favor of de novo judicial
interpretation, the latter by adopting a supermajority rule in lieu of a simple
majority rule.
(4) Chevron with a supermajority rule. In principle, there is no reason to
think that soft and hard solutions are mutually exclusive; the two might be
combined so as to capture the distinctive benefits of both regime (2) and
regime (3). In practice, however, this regime should suffer from the same
problems as regime (2), problems that we detail in full below. The defects of
regime (2) arise from the two-level structure of Chevron reasoning and the
burdens that structure imposes upon judges; merely grafting a supermajority
rule onto Chevron leaves the two-level structure in place and thus fails to get at
the root of the problem. Moreover, the pure cases-regimes (2) and (3)-
illustrate the relevant considerations more cleanly. Subject to that caveat,
Chevron with a supermajority rule could provide some of the benefits of a hard
voting rule, albeit without avoiding the costs of a soft doctrinal approach.
B. Aggregation: Solving Chevron Problems
We have suggested that Chevron doctrine requires judges to distinguish
between first-order interpretation- namely, finding the best reading of the
statute-and second-order interpretation, which supposes a theory of
permissible or reasonable interpretation. In operation, this requirement
produces a range of problems, many of which can be avoided or ameliorated by
adopting a voting-rule solution. For simplicity, we assume throughout that the
relevant case is binary -an agency offers one interpretation of the statute, a
challenger offers another, and the judicial task is to choose between them.
Some cases are not like this, but most cases are.
1. Conceptual Problems
What exactly does it mean to say that an agency's interpretation, although
not best by the judge's lights, is nonetheless reasonable or permissible? What
does it mean to say that a statute "clearly" means X, as opposed to saying that
the statute is best read to mean X? The answers to these questions are
themselves unclear. When applying the Chevron doctrine, the hardest question
is where, even in principle, the bounds of permissible interpretation should be
taken to lie.
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Consider the following scenario for expository purposes. Under standard
first-order interpretation, the judge (let us suppose) is considering two
different readings of the statute, X and Y. Consulting all legal materials that are
relevant under the judge's first-order, interpretive theory (text, perhaps
legislative history, perhaps various interpretive default rules, and so on), the
judge decides that reading X is, all things considered, somewhat superior to
Y- that X is 65% likely to be correct, while Y is only 35% likely to be correct.
Under de novo interpretation, the judge would vote in favor of X. Chevron,
however, requires another layer of decision-making. The judge must ask
whether X, at the 6S% level, is "clearly" correct as opposed to simply better;
alternatively, the judge could ask whether Y, at the 35% level, is reasonable or
permissible.
The example suggests that first-order interpretation is often strictly
comparative - the judge simply decides which interpretation is better - while a
theory of permissible interpretation must build in an absolute threshold above
which an interpretation may, but need not, be adopted by agencies. The
problem is that nothing in Chevron tells judges, even in principle, where the
threshold should be located, and the metric for setting the threshold is obscure.
Perhaps an interpretation that is plausible at the 35% level suffices; perhaps it
does not. Perhaps an interpretation that reaches the 65% level is "clearly"
correct, or perhaps not. And in both of these cases, it is hardly clear even what
the relevant "level" is. With judges of reasonably diverse preferences and
psychologies, thresholds may vary widely, and it is not possible to say that any
threshold is conceptually preferable to any other.
The switch to regime (3), Chevron as a voting rule, avoids the problem of an
absolute threshold altogether. Each judge now asks, simply in comparative
terms, what the better reading of the statute is. The purpose of Chevron's
second-order approach to interpretation -providing space for agency policy
judgments - is still fulfilled, just at the aggregate level of the whole court rather
than at the level of individual judicial judgments. Assuming reasonable and
predictable diversity of first-order interpretations across judges on multi-
member courts, breathing room for agency policy judgments will arise from
the operation of the voting rule itself. In our example, some judges will decide
that the agency's interpretation is worse than the one offered by the challenger;
other judges will decide that the agency's interpretation is much better. No
consideration of levels, thresholds, or percentages is required. Unless a
supermajority of the judges believes that the challenger has offered the better
interpretation, the agency will prevail. Across cases, as agency interpretations
become less and less plausible, it is more and more likely that a supermajority
will be found to overturn them. Crucially, however, none of the judges in any
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given case need wrestle with the conceptually obscure problem of where to
locate the threshold of permissible interpretation.
A nuance in this picture is worth emphasizing: to say that under de novo
judicial interpretation judges search for the "best" reading is imprecise,
although useful as a shorthand. When the case is binary, as we assume
throughout, judges need only decide which of the two readings offered by the
parties is the better one. This comparative judgment is, plausibly, much easier
than the judgment that Chevron requires about the location of the
reasonableness threshold. The latter judgment is an absolute one, with no clear
metric against which to make the judgment in the first place. It is familiar that
categorical judgments are often more difficult than comparative ones. The
question "Was the Duke of Wellington tall?" is harder than the question "Was
the Duke of Wellington taller than Napoleon?" People can get confused when
they make implicitly category-bound judgments, as when they say that an eagle
is "big" while a cabin is "small," but presumably few people would say that an
eagle is bigger than a cabin.4° Voters who know little about candidates' views
or positions, in absolute terms, are very good at knowing which candidate is
farther to the left or right, in relative terms.41 We suggest that assessing the
plausibility of an agency's interpretation has similar features.
Of course, there may well be settings in which a judgment about
plausibility is easier or less psychologically costly than a judgment about
optimality. For example, a reviewer evaluating a scientific study's conclusions
might easily find the conclusions plausible given the data, while a judgment
about whether the conclusions are best might require more aggressive
investigation. Our claim, however, is local rather than global. Under Chevron
doctrine, a judge consults the full panoply of sources to derive statutory
meaning at Step One. Although it is possible to imagine a parallel world in
which judges quickly glance at the statute to make sure an agency's
interpretation is not implausible, that is not our world; currently, Chevron
doctrine requires a far more elaborate inquiry.
These points bracket any questions about outcomes-about the rate at
which agency interpretations are upheld. It is possible, in particular cases, that
a shift from doctrinal Chevron to Chevron as a voting rule would result in
invalidations of agency interpretations that would not have occurred under
40. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1171-77
(2002).
41. See, e.g., Stuart Elaine MacDonald et al., Political Sophistication and Models of Issue Voting, 25
BRIT. J. POL. ScI. 453, 458 (1995) ("It is easier to know the side a party takes on an issue than
its particular policy proposals, and it is especially easy to know the side a party takes when it
is intense on an issue.").
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doctrinal Chevron. Consider a case in which (1) a supermajority of judges
believes that the agency's interpretation is reasonable (or, equivalently, that the
statute does not clearly rule it out) but also believe that (2) the agency's
interpretation is not the better reading. Under doctrinal Chevron the agency
will win if judges have internalized the doctrinal norm, because a majority will
vote in the agency's favor; under Chevron as a voting rule the agency will lose
because a supermajority will vote against the agency.
This is merely one possible case, however. Consider the opposite
possibility: any case in which a bare majority of judges believes that the statute
clearly rules out the agency's interpretation, or equivalently that the agency's
interpretation is impermissible. In such cases, the agency will lose under
doctrinal Chevron but will win under Chevron as a voting rule. It is unclear,
before the fact, which type of case is more frequent, and thus unclear what the
outcome effects of the change in regime would be. Moreover, if Chevron as a
voting rule produces too little deference according to some extrinsic theory, the
supermajority requirements can be calibrated upwards.
It follows that a shift to Chevron as a voting rule may change the mix of
cases in which the agency wins, even if the level or frequency of deference is
held constant. Low-intensity cases -in which a large supermajority of judges
thinks that the case is close but that the agency's reading is worse -will now be
decided against the agency; high-intensity cases-in which the judges are
polarized into a bare majority and a minority with sharply opposed views -will
be decided in the agency's favor. Intuitively, this switch seems perfectly
consistent with the rationales for Chevron. If the goal is to provide breathing
space to agencies to make technocratic or democratic judgments, especially in
contested domains of law and policy, then this change in the incidence of
deference is either an improvement or neutral. Whether the justification for
deference hinges on agency expertise or democratic pedigree, Chevron as a
voting rule performs equally well. Rather than encourage individual judges to
set aside their own views in favor of more expert or more democratic
judgments, the voting mechanism enforces respect for agency views at the
aggregate level.
Finally, our suggestion also sidesteps current controversies about which
legal sources count, and what weights are given to the sources that do count, at
Chevron Step One. Consider "nondelegation canons" - canons that trump
agency interpretations of otherwise ambiguous statutes and thus count as
reasons to hold statutes "clear" at Step One.4' On our view, such canons would
just be folded into the legal inquiry as reasons for individual judges to reject
42. See Cass R Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000).
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agency interpretations, all things considered, on the ground that the agency's
reading of the statute is likely to be wrong. The effect of such canons would
then be picked up by the voting rule; when a canon of this sort has weight, it is
more likely that individual judges will contribute to the supermajority
necessary to override the agency's interpretation.
2. Psychological Burdens
In an influential early discussion of Chevron and agency deference, then-
Judge Stephen Breyer touched on the problems inherent in judging under a
second-order theory of permissible interpretation:
A third reason why neither a strict view of Chevron nor any other
strictly defined verbal review formula requiring deference to an
agency's interpretation of law can prove successful in the long run, is
that such a formula asks judges to develop a cast of mind that often is
psychologically difficult to maintain. It is difficult, after having
examined a legal question in depth with the object of deciding it
correctly, to believe both that the agency's interpretation is legally
wrong, and that its interpretation is reasonable. More often one
concludes that there is a "better" view of the statute for example, and
that the "better" view is "correct," and the alternative view is
"erroneous.-43
Case law after Chevron provides some evidence for this view. Consider the
decision in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co.' The Court, per Justice
Antonin Scalia, concluded that an FCC rule exempting nondominant long-
distance carriers from a filed-rate requirement exceeded the agency's statutory
authority, which was merely the authority to "modify" that requirement.4" In
part, Scalia argued that the plain meaning of "modify" encompassed only small
changes, not large changes, pointing to dictionaries supporting his reading and
discounting a prominent dictionary that said the contrary.46 Scalia seemed to
assume that the statute's best reading (his own) was also the only permissible
reading. It is unclear whether, in fact, Breyer's conjecture is systematically
correct, but it is certainly plausible in light of decisions like MCI. If Breyer's
43. Breyer, supra note 26, at 379.
44. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
45. See id. at 231-32.
46. See id. at 227-28.
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claim is correct, then the requirements of Chevron doctrine are unstable because
second-order interpretation is psychologically demanding for judges.
Perhaps Breyer's claim proves too much. In many areas of law, judges are
asked to distinguish between their first-order judgments about what is correct
and their second-order judgments about what is permissible or reasonable.
Judges do this all the time; so how can it be unstable in the Chevron setting?
One possibility is that the distinction between first-order judgments and
second-order judgments is more likely to be stable with regard to questions of
fact than of law, as when trial judges ask whether a jury verdict is based on a
permissible view of the facts or when an appellate court does the same. The
idea that decisions on legal questions might be more or less plausible, as
opposed to correct or incorrect-that there might be different standards or
thresholds for "proving the law"47 - is still alien to many judges trained in the
pre-Chevron era.
More importantly, that judges make similar distinctions in other areas of
law does not show that they do so successfully or that Breyer was incorrect
about Chevron. It is certainly imaginable that, in those other areas, the
distinction tends to collapse as well, just as it does under Chevron (on Breyer's
view). The same social-scientific tools that have usefully exposed decision-
making distortions under Chevron might well be applied in other areas, with
similar debunking effect. That judges themselves think the distinction between
correctness and reasonableness works in some area of law is, of course, neither
here nor there. Breyer's critique itself suggests that judges will think they are
faithfully distinguishing the correct from the reasonable, while in fact self-
serving bias, motivated reasoning, and other mechanisms cause them to think
that the only reasonable view is the one they happen to find correct. Absent
some evidence about whether and when judges make such distinctions
successfully, the objection that "judges do it all the time" assumes away
Breyer's argument rather than rebuts it.
Suppose Breyer was right, about Chevron at least. Then it is
straightforward that the shift to Chevron as a voting rule will eliminate the
psychological burdens of second-order interpretation, removing a major source
of instability in the law of agency deference. The distinction between agency
interpretations that are correct and agency interpretations that are reasonable
will still exist. But the distinction need not be internalized by individual judges.
Instead, it will arise from the operation of the voting rule itself. Agency
interpretations that are reasonable will be more likely to attract the votes
necessary to block formation of a contrary supermajority.
47. Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859 (1992).
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3. Bias
Justice Breyer's psychological conjecture about Chevron is plausible, but
unproven. By contrast, there is ample evidence that a related sort of slippage
occurs under doctrinal Chevron: judges tend systematically to uphold agency
interpretations that accord with their political preferences and to invalidate
agency interpretations that do not. On both the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts, judges are more likely to uphold liberal agency action if they are
liberal and more likely to uphold conservative agency action if they are
conservative. 4 8 The concern is not that judges' first-order legal views collapse
into their second-order legal views but that their views are not being driven by
legal materials at all, or at least not wholly.
Of course, the attitudinal model of judging describes judicial behavior in
many settings, not just the law of agency deference. 49 The Chevron doctrine is
not the cause of biased judging. Yet we may plausibly conjecture that the
Chevron doctrine provides greater scope for the operation of bias than would
Chevron as a voting rule. Under the former regime, judges acting in bad faith or
in the grip of unconscious bias have, in effect, two margins on which to
advance their agendas: the first-order interpretive question and the second-
order interpretive question. A judge who wishes, for quite extrinsic reasons, to
uphold the agency interpretation may claim either that the agency
48. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 826-27. This is not to say that Chevron has made no
difference; there is conflicting evidence about whether it has increased deference to agencies.
An early study found a significant effect. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 199o DUKE L.J. 984, 1057-
59. However, other studies suggest either that Chevron has had little effect overall on
deference or that its effects are unclear. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial
Deference to Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
431, 474-75 (1996) ("Our tests show that the Court does not uniformly endorse judicial
deference, but rather does so discriminately in the years where the doctrine yields policy
outcomes more to the Court's liking."); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the
Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q0 351, 359 (1994) (asserting that Chevron had a limited
impact on the rate of affirmance of agencies' interpretations in the Supreme Court); Miles &
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 826 ("[I]t is unclear whether Chevron has any effect within the
Court."). Our thesis is not affected by this issue. Whatever level of deference Chevron has
produced, high or low, our argument is that the same level of deference can be produced at
lower cost by switching to a voting rule that favors agencies.
49. The literature is vast, but for a canonical overview, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). See also Frank B. Cross,
Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance,
92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251 (1997); cf. Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court
Justices' Decision Making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (2000) (questioning the adequacy of the
attitudinal model in explaining the Justices' adherence to precedent).
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interpretation is correct or that it is reasonable. Under Chevron as a voting rule,
by contrast, the judge who wishes to uphold the agency interpretation must
argue that the agency's reading is correct. To be sure, that determination may
be made in a biased fashion, just as determinations of the best reading of the
Constitution. Yet it is plausible that removing one margin on which bias can
operate will improve matters. Removing a degree of freedom for the biased
judge, all else being equal, should lower the costs of monitoring by other
judges, legislators, litigants, and interested publics.
What about the opposite case, in which the political judge wishes to
invalidate agency action? Under doctrinal Chevron, the judge must say that the
agency's interpretation is clearly incorrect. Under Chevron as a voting rule,
more simply, the judge must say that the agency's interpretation is incorrect. In
either case, the judge has only one degree of freedom; the difference between
them is that in the former case the legal inquiry is weighted in the agency's
favor, while in the latter case the voting rule is weighted in the agency's favor.
The upshot is that Chevron as a voting rule provides no more scope for biased
judges who wish to invalidate agency action, provides less scope for biased
judges who wish to validate agency action, and yet weights the scales in the
agency's favor to the same degree across all cases (or can be calibrated to do so,
as we discuss below). If reducing biased judging is desirable, then this is a pure
improvement, whatever level of deference to agencies one desires and whatever
particular conception of biased judging one holds.
4. A Note on Bias in the Lower Courts
The foregoing point applies to all courts, including the Supreme Court, in
which recent findings have shown discernible ideological voting in Chevron
cases."0 Lower courts present additional issues, in light of a recent finding that
ideological bias interacts with panel composition in Chevron cases. When three
judges of the same political party sit together, they are likely to show marked
ideological bias; when two judges of one party sit with one judge of the other,
the one is more likely to vote in line with the political predilections of the other
two than if she sat with two judges of her own party."1 How do these findings
bear on the choice between deference regimes?
Assuming for argument's sake that the findings reveal a problem, the
switch to Chevron as a voting rule would constitute an improvement. In the 2-1
case, under doctrinal Chevron plus majority rule, the lone dissenter knows that
so. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 825-27.
S. See id. at 851-65.
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her dissenting vote will not change the outcome and thus may have an
incentive to acquiesce in the majority's decision; whether the dissenter
acquiesces or records a dissent depends on, among other factors, the costs of
writing a sole opinion. Under Chevron as a voting rule, by contrast, any single
judge can decide the case in the agency's favor (because a 3-0 vote is necessary
to override the agency's interpretation); any incentive to acquiesce disappears.
What of the case in which three judges of the same political party sit
together on a panel and herd toward a preferred ideological outcome? Here the
only effect of Chevron as a voting rule is the one we previously discussed: by
removing a degree of freedom, Chevron as a voting rule makes it more difficult,
at the margin, for a biased group to justify its preferred results. If the three
judges are sufficiently determined, they may still rule as they please. But this
should be no surprise. When the judges on a panel are unanimously bent on
indulging their biases, there is little that either legal doctrine or voting rules
can do. Even this concern assumes that the desire to indulge bias is intentional.
If the bias is unconscious, then Chevron as a voting rule should still improve
matters for the psychological reasons already discussed. The switch to Chevron
as a voting rule is no cure-all, of course; we merely suggest that it would make
things better.
5. Internalization Versus Aggregation
There is a common thread running through the foregoing points. Doctrinal
Chevron imposes greater demands on the individual judge than does Chevron as
a voting rule. Doctrinal Chevron requires the individual judge to internalize a
complex, two-tier legal structure that has unclear conceptual foundations, that
is psychologically burdensome to maintain, and that provides multiple degrees
of freedom for the operation of bias, all without providing any meaningful
sanctions for deviation. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that
Chevron often fails, in the sense that the Chevron two-step does not seem to be
fairly applied; what is surprising is that it often succeeds. Chevron as a voting
rule, by contrast, makes deference an aggregate property of the voting group,
rather than a norm to be internalized by the individual judge, and thus
alleviates these burdens.
C. Calibration
1. On Large Appellate Courts
Another advantage of Chevron as a voting rule is the ability to better
calibrate the level of deference given to agency decisions. We begin with
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calibration on appellate courts with many members, such as the Supreme
Court and en banc courts of appeals.
Under doctrinal Chevron, judges are told to defer to reasonable agency
interpretations. The soft version of Chevron treats deference as though it were
an on-off switch, a binary variable. In our view, deference is better conceived as
a matter of degree. If the doctrinal solution is like a traditional light switch, the
voting rule is akin to a dimmer, allowing more fine-grained degrees of
deference to be matched to underlying legal goals. If, in practice, a deference
rule produces too little deference, then the voting rule allows deference to be
ratcheted up or ratcheted down with greater precision. On a nine-member
court, if a 5-4 majority rule generates too little deference to agencies, then a 6-3,
7-2, 8-1, or 9-0 requirement can be adopted. Requiring eight or nine votes to
overturn an agency action is the equivalent of an extremely strong norm of
deference within the doctrinal Chevron framework. We do not assert here that
such a strong deference rule is the optimal one. Our point is merely that no
matter what the optimal level of deference, be it strong, weak, or nonexistent,
the voting-rule model allows for more fine-grained calibration toward that
goal.
Such gradation is, of course, possible with doctrine as well. A doctrine
might command that agency action be overturned only if the decision is (a)
unreasonable, (b) clearly unreasonable, or (c) ridiculous. There is no shortage
of linguistic variants in theory, and as a result soft doctrinal rules are capable of
calibration too. Historical experience, however, suggests the categorical
distinctions are riddled with uncertainty. How much less deference does the
"unreasonable" standard produce than the "clearly unreasonable" standard? A
lot? A little? None at all? Indeed, the more linguistic variants one uses, the
greater a morass the doctrinal approach becomes.
For an example from administrative law, consider the arbitrary and
capricious and substantial evidence standards for review of factual
determinations in agency proceedings. The arbitrary and capricious standard of
review for informal proceedings 2 is more deferential than the substantial
evidence standard the APA uses in formal proceedings, s" or so many
commentators have suggested.14 But over time the two standards have
52. 5 U.S.C. § 7o6(2)(A) (2ooo); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 7o6(2)(E).
54. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1383, 1429-30
(2004) (noting the debate over which test is more deferential); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard
E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions,
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arguably converged," further illustrating the instability that arises when
linguistic distinctions are used to calibrate deference. Although the standards
are different in theory, in practice the dividing line seems to have been all but
erased. This is not the fault of judges, at least not directly. It is a consequence
of the difficulty of using relatively crude linguistic distinctions to calibrate
different levels of deference in particular settings.
2. In the Lower Courts
The larger the number of judges or Justices on a multi-member court, the
greater the ability to calibrate. The calibration argument therefore applies to
the Supreme Court or to circuit courts sitting en banc, but not to three-judge
panels. With three judges, the only possible voting rules are majority (2-1) and
unanimity (3-0), which yields only one degree of calibration. This does not
mean that voting-rule deference is bereft of benefits for three-judge panels;
quite the contrary. But we cannot count calibration as one of them.
This might simply suggest that the size of lower court panels be
increased-perhaps to five judges in administrative law cases. This transition
would significantly increase the decisional burdens on individual judges by
requiring them to sit in more cases and is a separate proposal, one we will not
pursue here. The larger point is that some objections to Chevron as a voting
rule might easily be remedied by small changes on other margins of
institutional design.
Administrative law is centrally concerned with identifying the appropriate
degree of deference that courts should give agencies. We have explicitly set
aside the question of how much deference is optimal, as the calibration benefit
exists regardless of how much deference an extrinsic theory suggests. In any
given case, calibration may prove difficult independent of whether deference is
achieved using voting rules or norms. Our focus is not on adjustment in any
specific case but on the calibration of overall systemic deference. Calibration via
voting rules is no more difficult than calibration using linguistic categories. In
either case, a court must decide that more or less deference is justified in certain
settings. Either doctrine or voting rules theoretically could be calibrated in
44 DuKE L.J. 1051, 1o65 & n.48 (1995) (same); see also Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec.
Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983).
55. See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the arbitrary and capricious test is the same
as the substantial evidence test as applied to findings of fact); see also Matthew J. McGrath,
Note, Convergence of the Substantial Evidence and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review
During Informal Rulemaking, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 541, 553-63 (1986).
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precisely the same way. But the tools judges and legislators use to calibrate
should be up to the task. As compared to voting rules, linguistic distinctions
are fragile and often ineffective tools for calibrating deference levels.
D. Certainty
The shift from a soft internalized norm of deference to deference as an
aggregate property also reduces costly uncertainty of several sorts in
administrative law. Voting-rule deference increases predictability and stability
and reduces subjective uncertainty. To the extent that clarity, precision, and the
ability of potential litigants to predict litigated outcomes confidently are
desirable, Chevron as a voting rule is preferable to doctrinal deference.
1. Predictability
To say that there is uncertainty in a legal regime is really to say that it is
difficult to predict the content of legal rules, the likelihood that a given rule will
be applied, or how such rules will translate into legal outcomes. 6 Chevron
supposedly displaced two lines of cases, one of which commanded courts to
review agency determinations of law de novo and the other of which suggested
deference.5 7 Before Chevron, the Court would emphasize either one line of cases
or the other in an ad hoc, unpredictable way, creating uncertainty for agencies
and litigants. Chevron was supposed to remedy this, but it has hardly fulfilled
its promise. On our view, that should not be surprising. One of the key reasons
for the apparent failure of Chevron to eliminate or even significantly reduce
uncertainty about deference is that the framework makes deference an
individual rather than aggregate property of the judicial system and therefore
relies on under-specified norms that are imperfectly internalized by judges.
To get some traction on these questions, return to two points above. First,
doctrinal Chevron contains inherent ambiguity about what it demands of
judges. All agree that judges should defer to reasonable-that is to say,
permissible- agency interpretations. But as we have already discussed, what
permissible means is itself highly uncertain. How unlikely must an agency
interpretation be before it is impermissible ? Ninety percent unlikely? Forty-five
percent unlikely? The Court has not said, and the views of individual judges
will vary; again, even the metric or scale for answering such questions is
56. For a general treatment of predictability and uncertainty in the context of precedent, see
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571,597-98 (1987).
S. See supra note 38.
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conceptually obscure. Variation in views on this question across judges
generates an additional dimension of uncertainty.
Moreover, suppose we are correct that compressing Chevron into a single-
step inquiry-thereby removing one degree of freedom for bias to operate-
reduces the ability of biased judges to manipulate the outcome of cases. As long
as the potential injection of bias is a source of uncertainty about how judges
will behave, the reduction of that source should produce a corresponding gain
along the certainty dimension. The core intuition is simply that adopting
decision processes that are less discretionary and more parsimonious should
reduce uncertainty.
Within the doctrinal Chevron framework, agencies and regulated parties
know that as a formal matter deference will be given to agency interpretations.
But whether deference will be given in practice is a function of heterogeneous
interpretive methods used by individual judges and divergent views about the
degree of clarity in statutes. Take Justices Breyer and Scalia as ideal types.
Scalia favors a broad application of deference to all agency decisions that
represent the authoritative view of the agency, a strong rule-like presumption
about whether to apply the deference framework at all, and aggressive
textualist statutory analysis that is alleged to be far more likely than not to find
that Congress definitely resolved the issue. s8 Breyer favors application of the
Chevron doctrine to a narrower range of cases, a case-by-case inquiry into
whether to apply the deference framework, and an interpretive method that is
alleged to be more likely to find statutory ambiguity at Chevron Step One. 9
Focusing on just two Justices produces confusion about how Chevron will
function in each of these three dimensions. The picture is no rosier when we
expand the universe of potential judges beyond Scalia and Breyer. Each judge
brings interpretive idiosyncrasies to the task. The unfortunate result is marked
heterogeneity of views about how doctrinal Chevron functions. Unfortunately,
the more heterogeneity we observe at the level of the individual judge, the less
certainty there is about how (and even whether) doctrinal Chevron will
function in practice.
Chevron as a voting rule need not negotiate these pitfalls. Conditional on an
agreed-upon trigger for either doctrinal or voting-rule deference, the agency's
decision will be upheld unless a supermajority of the panel concludes that the
agency's interpretation of the statute was incorrect. Different judges may well
have different thresholds for identifying the "right" answer in statutory
interpretation. But doctrinal Chevron produces uncertainty at an additional
58. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 25, at 859-60.
59. See Brcyer, supra note 26, at 372-82.
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stage of the analysis as well-the determination whether the agency's
interpretation is permissible.
To be sure, the increase in predictability may vary somewhat with respect
to certain subsets of cases. Consider a statute that is vaguely phrased or
specified at a high level of generality. If each judge on a panel is completely
unsure whether the agency is correct, such that each would flip a coin,
individual-level deference would cause each judge to vote for the agency.
Chevron doctrine essentially constitutes a tie-breaker for each judge in this
scenario. Given the same circumstances, under Chevron as a voting rule, the
agency's decision will be rejected roughly 12% of the time on a three-judge
panel, because there is a one-in-eight chance that all three judges will "decide"
(randomly) to vote against the agency. In this stylized example, it is possible
that doctrinal deference would produce greater predictability than voting-rule
deference. However, the voting rule still produces extremely predictable
deference-in about 90% of the draws the agency's decision will be upheld.
Even in a world where judges essentially flip coins, the voting rule produces
quite predictable outcomes.6"
60. A closely related but analytically distinct question is whether voting-rule deference produces
greater stability in the law, a question that parallels stare decisis commentary. See generally
Lawrence E. Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Dynamics of the Legal Process, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 405, 408-10 (1982); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REv. 643 (2000). Strong
norms of stare decisis are supposedly desirable because they support reliance interests and
reduce uncertainty in the legal system. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal
Change, 49 UCLA L. REv. 789, 823 (2002). With respect to precedent, both courts and
commentators focus on stability. Stability in turn reduces to the actual probability of legal
change. A low probability of legal change corresponds to a strong norm of stare decisis, and
a high probability to a weak or nonexistent norm. We have little to add to the debate about
the optimal level of change or stickiness in the law. See generally Louis Kaplow, Transition
Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161 (2003) (developing a
conceptual framework for assessing the desirability of different policy approaches to
undertaking legal change); Frederick Schauer, Legal Development and the Problem of
Systematic Transition, 13 J. CONTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES 261 (2003) (comparing the costs of small-
scale legal transition to those of large-scale legal transition). However, all the arguments we
have made about voting-rule deference apply with equal force to stare decisis. Stare decisis is
a somewhat crude mechanism for ensuring the stability of precedents. Supermajority voting
rules would accomplish identical goals, with greater calibration and fewer costs. The
flexibility afforded by the voting rule avoids the inevitable uncertainty involved in lumpy
linguistic formulations like "strong" and "super-strong" deference accorded to prior judicial
decisions. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1362 (1988); see also Frank Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 422, 427 (1988); Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177 (1989).
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2. Subjective Uncertainty
Related to the predictability issue, Chevron as a voting rule also reduces
subjective uncertainty. What matters is not only the actual content of the law,
the probability that a given legal rule will be applied, or the ultimate
probability that an agency decision will be overturned, but also how agencies
and regulated parties perceive events in judicial challenges. How costly is it for
potential litigants to accurately predict these dynamics in the respective
deference frameworks?
When an agency promulgates a rule, both the agency and the regulated
parties will attempt to estimate the probability that the decision will survive a
challenge in the courts. If the EPA thinks a final rule is unlikely to survive, it
may not promulgate it at all. More likely, the agency will revise the rule to
reduce the probability that the rule will be struck down. A private party
affected by the rule must make a similar calculation. Suppose the EPA
Administrator estimates the probability of overturning to be p=o.25. This
estimate carries with it a variance that can be understood as the degree of
subjective uncertainty about the point estimate.
Imagine a simple bell curve with the agency's point estimate (in the
hypothetical example, 0.25) as the mean. 61 As the variance of the estimate
diminishes, the slope over the curve becomes steeper; the distribution becomes
more compressed around the point estimate. As the variance increases, the
slope becomes more gradual and the distribution more spread out. In Bayesian
terms, the precision of the estimate changes. The Administrator may be
extremely confident that p=o.25, believing, for example, that there is some
reasonable chance that p actually equals 0.30 or o.2o, but that there is virtually
no chance it is higher or lower than that. In this case, the curve, representing
her subjective uncertainty, will be quite compact, and we characterize this as a
low-uncertainty case. Alternatively, the Administrator may hold the same point
estimate, p=o.25, that the courts will strike down the final rule, but may have
greater subjective uncertainty about the estimate. (Envision a longer-tailed
distribution, with the low end of the curve approaching zero and the high end
of the curve approaching o.85.) We characterize this as a high-uncertainty case.
Our claim is that Chevron as a voting rule reduces subjective uncertainty of this
sort; it allows potential litigants to form better, more confident, estimates of
the probability that agency decisions will be upheld. The two regimes might
also produce actual changes in p, but we intentionally hold p constant for
purposes of discussion.
61. The technically proper probability distribution function would not be normal, but a
distribution bounded by o and 1, like the beta distribution.
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Why might Chevron as a voting rule reduce subjective uncertainty? To start
with, the variance of an aggregate judgment is partially a function of the
variance of its component parts. Suppose that the EPA must decide how a
randomly selected judge will vote in a given case. To calculate that estimate in
the doctrinal Chevron framework, the agency must ascertain whether the judge
will find a clear congressional statement in the statute and whether, absent a
clear statutory resolution of the issue, the agency's interpretation is reasonable.
One possibility is that the EPA takes the statute to be clear and estimates that
the judge will agree. Here, there is uncertainty about that judgment, but there
is no additional uncertainty from Chevron Step Two. If, however, the EPA
takes the statute to be ambiguous and estimates that the judge will agree, it
must also estimate the probability that the judge will find its interpretation
reasonable as well. There is a variance associated with the estimates required at
both Step One and Step Two of Chevron. Because Chevron as a voting rule
requires only one stage of estimation, the variance will be lower. The simple
claim is that the fewer stages of judicial decision that the EPA must guess
about, the less subjective uncertainty will characterize the Administrator's
judgment.
Subjective uncertainty is also reduced by making deference an aggregate
rather than individual characteristic. A supermajority voting rule generates less
subjective uncertainty than does doctrinal deference because an external
observer need not estimate whether each individual judge and a majority of
judges will fully internalize the norm of deference. Figuring out whether
deference will result no longer requires potential litigants to guess whether or
how individual judges will defer. Rather, deference is an unavoidable
characteristic of the voting procedure. As a result, external observers can have
greater confidence in their judgments.
In none of these uncertainty contexts does Chevron as a voting rule fare
worse than doctrinal Chevron, and in many contexts it fares better. Outcomes
of administrative law cases will be more predictable and likely clearer and
simpler from the view of external observers. On balance, infusing deference
into the law via voting rules should reduce confusion and uncertainty and
replace it with greater clarity and transparency.
III. COSTS AND OBJECTIONS
So far we have discussed the benefits of switching from doctrinal Chevron
to Chevron as a voting rule; our suggestion has been that the switch would
accomplish the objectives of doctrinal Chevron at lower cost. Are there
offsetting costs that would arise from switching to the new regime? Here we
examine some objections to Chevron as a voting rule. We suggest that these
708
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
116:6 76 2007
CHEVRON AS A VOTING RULE
objections either are invalid, or apply equally to doctrinal Chevron, and thus
afford no basis for preferring one regime to the other.
A. Voting Theorems
Under Chevron as a voting rule, a supermajority of a multi-member judicial
panel would be necessary to overturn agency interpretations of law. Two well-
known voting theorems -May's Theorem and the Condorcet Jury Theorem -
support majority rule. Neither theorem, however, supplies a cogent objection
to a supermajority rule in this setting.
i. May's Theorem
In the simplest version, when two options are involved, May's Theorem
says that only majority rule satisfies a stipulated set of conditions, including
neutrality (neither option is preferred by the voting rule), anonymity (the
outcome does not depend upon which voter ends up on which side), and two
more technical conditions. 62 The force of May's Theorem is that if the
conditions are attractive, majority rule should also be attractive. Conversely, if
one rejects majority rule in some setting, one should also be willing to explain
why one or more conditions of the Theorem are unattractive.6 3
In this setting, the nub of the argument is that neutrality should be
rejected. The outcome in which the agency interpretation prevails is more
desirable than the outcome in which the agency interpretation is rejected, and
the voting-rule version of Chevron merely reflects this. The point of Chevron is
to put a thumb on the scales in favor of agency interpretations of law, in order
to allocate interpretive authority between agencies and courts. A Chevron
supermajority rule does so formally, through the aggregation mechanism;
doctrinal Chevron with a majority rule does so as well, just informally, through
62. Kenneth 0. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority
Decision, 20 ECONOMETRICA 68o (1952). The other two conditions are universal domain or
decisiveness (roughly, the voting rule yields a definite outcome for any set of preference
orderings) and positive responsiveness (roughly, any voter can break a tie by changing her
vote).
63. We bracket here recent extensions of May's Theorem to multiple options. See Robert E.
Goodin & Christian List, A Conditional Defense of Plurality Rule: Generalizing May's Theorem
in a Restricted Informational Environment (EconWPA, Working Paper No. 0409010, 2005),
available at http://129.3.2o.41/eps/pe/papers/o4o9/o4o9olo.pdf. We have assumed,
throughout, that in most cases judges will face a choice between the agency's interpretation
and one offered by a litigant, and in any event many of our points hold, with appropriate
modifications, when extended to the multiple-option case.
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legal doctrine that individual judges are required to internalize. The move to
doctrinal Chevron in 1984 already rejected neutrality, in substance if not in
form. Our suggestion is just that the rejection of neutrality is best done
explicitly in the voting rule itself. Whether or not the suggestion is persuasive
on other grounds, May's Theorem supplies no valid objection to it.
2. Supermajority Rules and the Status Quo
Related to the foregoing is a point about agencies and policy change. A
standard observation in voting theory is that supermajority rules, by violating
neutrality, place a thumb on the scales in favor of the status quo.64 One might
worry that using a supermajority rule in place of Chevron deference will
produce too much status quo bias.
However, the status quo must be understood here in a legal rather than
factual sense. Suppose, as is usually the case, that the agency moves first by
issuing an interpretation of the statute; this interpretation then becomes the
new legal status quo. A supermajority rule in favor of the agency's
interpretation protects the new status quo as defined by the agency. This
approach does not protect the policy status quo, however. To the contrary,
freeing up agencies to change policies, as Chevron does in either the doctrinal
version or the voting-rule version, works to prevent regulatory policy from
becoming obsolete. Under either version of Chevron, it is entirely legitimate for
agencies to update policies in light of changing circumstances or changing
democratic preferences.6
3. The Jury Theorem
The Condorcet Jury Theorem says that when right answers exist, and when
the average voter in the group is more likely than not to get the right answer
(i.e., average voting competence exceeds 0.5), then the probability that
majority voting will hit the right answer increases as the group's size increases
and as its average competence increases.66 Perhaps the Jury Theorem suggests
64. This is (by definition) only true of "asymmetrical" supermajority rules, not of symmetrical
ones; the latter respect neutrality but yield nontrivial ties. For an explanation of these terms,
see Robert E. Goodin & Christian List, Special Majorities Rationalized, 36 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
213, 215-16 (20o6).
65. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
66. The Jury Theorem can be extended to multiple options, in which case plurality rule is
preferred. See Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the
CondorcetJury Theorem, 9J. POL. PHIL. 277, 283-88 (2001).
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that majority rule is preferable because a simple majority of judicial votes is
most likely to get the answer right.
It is important to be clear that this point does not support regime (2),
Chevron plus a majority rule, as compared to regime (3), de novo judicial
interpretation plus a supermajority rule. The only plausible candidate for a
"right answer" here is that there might be a right answer about what the
relevant statute means. To ask that question is to engage in de novo judicial
interpretation, not Chevron deference. The Jury Theorem objection is in effect
an argument for regime (1), de novo judicial interpretation with majority rule.
As our concern is to compare regimes (2) and (3), the objection is somewhat
tangential to our enterprise. The regime we suggest is not Condorcetian, but
neither is the current regime.
In any event, the objection is also dubious on its own terms, for two
reasons. First, we have said that de novo judicial interpretation requires judges
to decide which party offers the better interpretation of the statute, after
considering all permissible sources. It is an open question whether this sort of
legally better answer counts as a "right answer" within the terms of the Jury
Theorem. Even if the better legal answer is quite indisputable relative to the
rules, conventions, and practices of the law, it is a separate and complex
jurisprudential question whether that answer can be right or wrong in the same
way that a guess about the number of beans in a jar can be right or wrong.
The second and more critical point is that even if the legally best answer
counts as a "right answer" in the required sense, the Jury Theorem does not at
all support a simple majority voting rule among judges. The confusion here is a
common one in discussions of the Jury Theorem. The Jury Theorem itself says
nothing at all about the composition of the group that should be governed by
majority rule; it is always necessary to ask "a majority of what?" Arguments
from the Jury Theorem to judicial majority rules are often flawed because they
assume, arbitrarily, that only the votes of a majority ofjudges should be decisive,
when in fact the votes of agency decision-makers are also useful inputs for Jury
Theorem purposes.
Here is an artificial example, for clarity. Suppose a multi-member
administrative commission, like the FCC, votes 4-1 in favor of an
interpretation, and suppose there is a correct interpretation within the terms of
the Jury Theorem. Suppose also that review goes directly to the nine-member
Supreme Court, which splits 5-4 against the rule. The Jury Theorem, taken by
itself, does not in the least suggest that the Court's view should trump the
agency's. If all voters possess the same average competence, it is arbitrary to
exclude the voters who happen to sit on the Commission; with their votes,
there is an 8-6 majority in the rule's favor. Even if the Justices have higher
average competence, including the agency voters can only improve the group's
711
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
aggregate accuracy, as long as the agency voters' average competence exceeds
0.5. At a minimum, even if courts should not look behind an agency's decision
to count the votes cast inside the agency, the agency should at least be counted
as having cast one vote.6 7
In the above example, the distribution of votes cuts in favor of the agency,
but in other examples it would not. Our point is simply that that the Jury
Theorem alone says nothing about why only judicial votes should be counted.
From this perspective, a supermajority rule in the agency's favor is, in effect, a
way to ensure that the agency has at least one virtual "vote" in the judicial
proceedings. The objection assumes, without foundation, that majority rule
among the judges alone should be decisive. The Jury Theorem, rightly
understood, does not require this; indeed it supports the expansion of the
group whose views are aggregated to include agency officials, and the
supermajority rule in effect does just that.
B. Single-Member Courts
A voting rule cannot be used to generate deference on single-member
panels. When a single judge considers and resolves a question of administrative
law, an internalized norm of decision is the only viable way to provide
deference to agency views. If most Chevron questions were ultimately resolved
by district courts, that would surely limit the significance of our proposal.
However, most agency rules and many orders are appealed directly to the
courts of appeals.68 Statutes providing authority to a diverse universe of
agencies provide for direct review of agency actions in the courts of appeals.6"
67. Evan Caminker makes similar points in discussing courts, legislatures, and supermajority
voting in the constitutional setting. See Caminker, supra note 8, at 98-1O1.
68. Cf. Currie & Goodman, supra note 15, at 5 (discussing agency orders).
69. The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 was a model for many subsequent statutes on
this front. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 720 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2000)).
For example, the Natural Gas Act provides that a party aggrieved by an order of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission may petition for review directly to the courts of appeals. 15
U.S.C. § 717r(b) (2000). The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 provides that adjudicative
orders issued under the statute may be appealed directly to the D.C. Circuit or the circuit in
which the party is located. 15 U.S.C. S 3416(a)(4) (2000). The Presidential Primary
Matching Payment Account Act provides that decisions by the FEC as to funds are reviewed
by the D.C. Circuit, 26 U.S.C. § 9041(a) (2000), as are other FEC decisions. Orders and
decisions by the FCC are generally directly reviewed by the D.C. Circuit. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 4 02(b) (2000). Decisions of the SEC are appealed directly to the courts of appeals as well,
15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2000), as are most decisions of the NLRB, 29 U.S.C. S 16o(e)
(2000). Certain statutes, of course, give exclusive jurisdiction to a specific court of appeals,
as the Clean Air Act does with review of EPA rules in the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C.
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For the most part, review of agency action by single-member courts is of
distinctly marginal importance in administrative law.
This is not to say to say that district courts never issue initial decisions
reviewing agency action. For example, challenges to enforcement actions
pursuant to existing regulations will typically be brought in the district courts.
And for this subset of cases, Chevron as a voting rule could be implemented in
one of two ways. First, the district court could engage in de novo review of the
agency action, subject to supermajority review by the multi-member appellate
court. Second, the district court could continue to apply doctrinal deference
while the reviewing panel would apply voting-rule deference. The former rule
would eliminate deference at the district court level but would reveal helpful
information about the district judge's view of the statute. The district judge's
view would then supply another data point for the court of appeals, along with
the parties' appellate arguments. The second alternative is what we term a
"mixed rule": voting-rule review of a doctrinal deference decision.7°
We remain agnostic as to which alternative is preferable; either one is
compatible with our proposal. As to the first alternative, district judges would
not defer themselves, but that is of little significance because district court
decisions are of little legal significance in administrative law (except as useful
information for appellate courts). District court opinions have no precedential
weight, and under current practice, reviewing courts tend to focus almost
exclusively on the reasonableness of the agency's decision, rather than on
whether the district court's evaluation of the agency's action was faulty.
Chevron commands deference to agency views; doctrinally the lower court's
decision is all but irrelevant.
If one cares about ensuring deference by district judges as well as appellate
courts, a mixed rule would have to be used. Yet mixing hard and soft deference
rules at different levels of review does not generally produce perverse results.
To illustrate, suppose the district court judge applies a norm of deference and
finds the agency's interpretation permissible. There are four possible scenarios
on appeal.
(1) A supermajority of the reviewing panel concludes the agency's interpretation
was incorrect. Here, the agency's decision is struck down, but there is no
conceptual oddity. The appeals court and the district court disagreed, as upper
and lower courts often do. The district court judge and the appeals court
judges are, of course, asking slightly different legal questions. But the mere fact
S 7 6o 7 (b)(i) (2000). These examples are merely illustrative. The action in administrative
law unquestionably takes place in the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, even more
so than in most areas of the law.
70. See infia Subsection II.F.3 for a more complete discussion of mixed rules.
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that an appeals court rejects an agency action while a district court upholds it is
not problematic.
(2) A supermajority of the panel thinks the agency chose the right interpretation.
The agency's decision is upheld in both the district and circuit court; the hard
and soft rules produce the same outcome.
(3) A bare majority of the circuit court finds the agency's interpretation incorrect,
and therefore the agency's decision is upheld. Again the voting rule and doctrinal
deference norms both produce the same result.
(4) A bare majority of the circuit court finds the agency's decision correct, which
implies that a minority of the appellate court found the decision incorrect. The
agency's decision is upheld because a supermajority did not disagree. Again,
the lower court and the reviewing panel reach the same decision.
None of these scenarios is unseemly. To the extent that deference is
desirable in district courts, our voting rule cannot provide it. A soft doctrinal
rule is the only option available, its imperfections notwithstanding. However,
this observation does not imply that we should choose an inferior solution in
more important settings like the Supreme Court, where (we suggest) more
effective alternatives exist.
C. Chevron as a Voting Rule, Step Zero?
When exactly would Chevron as a voting rule apply? Under Mead and its
successors, the Court has rejected, for the time being, Justice Scalia's argument
that Chevron applies whenever the agency decision is "authoritative."7 Instead
the Court has developed an elaborate body of law- Chevron Step Zero72- that
determines whether Chevron will apply at all. Under Chevron Step Zero, the
Court asks, roughly, whether there is an affirmative indication of congressional
intent to delegate law-interpreting power to the agency, using various
procedural indicators as defeasible proxies in this inquiry."
Our proposal is neutral with respect to Chevron Step Zero. The voting rule
we suggest would apply when, and only when, Chevron Steps One and Two
would otherwise apply under the doctrinal Chevron framework. If Scalia's view
were to prevail, then the Chevron voting rule would be triggered by any
authoritative agency interpretation. Under the current approach, the Chevron
voting rule would be triggered by an affirmative finding of congressional intent
pi. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2001).
72. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note z5, at 873; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L.
REv. 187 (2006).
73. Mead, 533 U.S. 218.
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to delegate interpretive authority to the agency. Chevron Step Zero has
produced substantial uncertainty and ferment in the law of administrative
deference.74 Our proposal does not inevitably improve this situation, but it
does not worsen it either. We simply adopt whatever triggering conditions
doctrinal Chevron assumes.
Our approach, however, could also be extended to Step Zero. A
supermajority voting rule would produce benefits and reduce uncertainty at
Chevron Step Zero, although it would complicate the core analysis somewhat. If
some extrinsic theory suggests that most agency actions should qualify for
Chevron deference, it would be easy to require a supermajority vote to remove
an agency action from the Chevron framework and send it to either de novo
review or Skidmore deference. That voting rule would reduce uncertainty at
Step Zero and could also be calibrated to produce a pro-deference bias if
desirable. If instead it were decided that agency actions should rarely qualify
for deference, a supermajority rule cutting against deference could just as easily
be implemented. Regardless, the point is that a voting-rule formulation of
Mead produces virtually the same benefits vis-a-vis the doctrinal formulation of
Mead as the voting-rule version of Chevron produces vis-a-vis its doctrinal
cousin.
D. Agency Flexibility
Might using a voting rule to generate institutional deference undermine an
agency's ability to change course and adopt new interpretations in light of new
information? In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Services," the Court clarified the interaction between a prior judicial
interpretation of statutory language and an agency's subsequent and different
interpretation of the same language. 6 The Brand X majority held that a
"court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and
thus leaves no room for agency discretion."77 Put differently, when a court
74. See Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003); see also Lisa
Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1443, 1457 (2005).
75. 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
76. For a proposal to address sequencing problems of this sort, see Kenneth A. Bamberger,
Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1272 (2002).
77. 125 S. Ct. at 2700.
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rejects an agency position because the statute unambiguously commands the
interpretation the court adopts, the agency may not later adopt a different
position. When a court acknowledges statutory ambiguity, the agency retains
the flexibility to pick new interpretations in the future78 - including an
interpretation different from the one the prior court thought best.79 When a
court finds that a statute requires a given interpretation, the agency is bound;
when a court finds merely that an agency position is permitted, the agency is
not bound.
How would the Brand X framework interact with the regime we suggest?
Because Chevron as a voting rule dispenses with the secondary reasonableness
inquiry of doctrinal Chevron, perhaps the voting rule would reduce agency
flexibility more frequently than does doctrinal Chevron. This might be good, or
bad, but it would be an important difference.
However, there is no particularly good reason to think that any such
reduction in flexibility will occur. As long as a supermajority of the reviewing
court does not reject the agency's interpretation, the agency remains free to
adjust its position in the future (as long as its changes in position are
sufficiently explained, a requirement that obtains under doctrinal Chevron as
wellS°). For example, if, in the first case, the agency wins because a bare
majority of Justices votes against the agency (5-4), then, in the second case
challenging the agency's change in position, the agency can again win by
obtaining four votes in its favor. Institutional deference preserves all agency
flexibility.
If, by contrast, a supermajority of a panel rejects the agency's interpretation
as incorrect, the agency may not readopt its old position. But that is also true
when a court rejects an agency's interpretation of a statute as clearly wrong or
unreasonable in the doctrinal Chevron framework, as Brand X makes clear."1 No
greater reduction in agency flexibility inheres in the hard voting rule than in
the soft doctrinal rule.
E. Decision Costs
Perhaps the switch from doctrinal Chevron to Chevron as a voting rule
(what we have called regimes (2) and (3)) would increase the costs of decision-
making, at least for judges. Suppose that under doctrinal Chevron, judges
78. Id. at 2700-01.
79. See id. at 2719-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8o. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983).
81. 125 S. Ct. at 2700.
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sometimes decide that the agency's proffered interpretation is reasonable, in
the absolute sense required by Chevron, without deciding which party's
interpretation is better (the comparative judgment required by de novo
interpretation). In those cases, the judges avoid a further inquiry that is
required under Chevron as a voting rule and thus economize on the burdens of
decision. Judges can use the reasonableness inquiry to avoid the harder
question of what the statute, correctly interpreted, should best be taken to say.
The argument fails on several grounds. First, it is not the case that regime
(3) requires judges to decide everything they must decide in regime (2) and
then adds more. Rather, regime (3) replaces the reasonableness question with
the question of the better interpretation. If the latter question is less costly to
answer than the former, then the decision costs of regime (3) are lower, not
higher, than the decision costs of regime (2). We suggested above that the
particular question of whether an agency interpretation is reasonable is indeed
harder, on average, than the question of which party has the better
interpretation. The former requires an absolute judgment that must be made
without any theory of what counts as reasonable and without any clear metric.
The latter requires a relative judgment, which is often easier.
Second, it is erroneous to say that under regime (2) the judge need only
decide reasonableness. Given the current law, particularly the Brand X decision,
regime (2) requires the judge to go further, sooner or later, and decide whether
the agency interpretation is reasonable because it is the only permissible
answer or because it is permissible but not required. Under Brand X, as we
have seen above, the two types of "reasonable" agency interpretations have very
different legal consequences, so the determination whether the agency has
offered one type of reasonable interpretation or the other cannot be postponed
forever.
Of course that further determination need not be made in the first case; it
can be postponed to the second case, or the nth. But the only sensible question
from the perspective of institutional design is which regime produces higher
decision costs across the complete array of cases. The objection rests on the
erroneous premise that reasonableness is, under the current law, all that judges
have to decide. Because the law requires them to go further, doctrinal Chevron
has no advantage over the regime we suggest as far as decision costs are
concerned.
Third, the objection focuses too narrowly on the decision costs incurred by
the individual judge, as opposed to the net decision costs of the overall system
of litigation. Suppose, contrary to our earlier suggestion, that it is easiest-
perhaps all too easy-for individual judges to say that one agency
interpretation is reasonable, another is not, and so on, without making relative
judgments about better answers. Still, we have emphasized that different
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judges will have different thresholds of reasonableness and will reach different
conclusions in ways that agencies, litigants, and others will find difficult to
predict. In that case, deciding on the basis of ungrounded judgments of
"reasonableness" may minimize decision costs for individual judges but inflict
larger decision costs on others, who will find it difficult to decide what to do
when the aggregate behavior of a set ofjudges is unpredictable. We might even
object that under the reasonableness approach, judges are exporting decision
costs to other actors in the legal system, simplifying their own task while
creating net systemic harms. To the extent that judges are self-interested, we
should worry that they will be too receptive to any approach that reduces their
decision costs.
If these matters are unclear, provoking different intuitions in different
observers, the fair-minded conclusion is that the issue of aggregate decision
costs probably does not cut strongly in one direction or the other. In an
individual case, decision costs might increase or decrease, but any net shift is
likely a secondary consideration.8 2 The definite advantages of switching to
Chevron as a voting rule are unlikely to be swamped by ambiguous, and
probably minor, considerations of this sort.
F. Strategic Behavior
Might Chevron as a voting rule create the opportunity for strategic voting or
allow for judicial manipulation of outcomes in a way that doctrinal Chevron
does not? On balance, we think not, but there are several potential issues to
consider.
1. Circumvention Through Bargaining
A crass objection is that the voting rule might be easy to circumvent if
judges are willing to trade votes across cases. As long as judicial preferences in
one case are more intense than in another case, the judge could implicitly or
explicitly agree to change her vote in the low-intensity case in exchange for
someone else's vote in her high-intensity case. This is a bargain across cases, or
a logroll.
This claim is of course true, but it is no more true of supermajority voting
rules than of majority voting rules. If judges are willing to trade votes across
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cases, there is little that either hard or soft deference doctrines can do about the
matter. Indeed, by raising the number of votes needed to change the status
quo, the supermajority voting rule makes such trades somewhat more difficult,
though not impossible. Additionally, if we are correct that interpretive
questions under Chevron as a voting rule are less fuzzy than under the doctrinal
inquiry, the costs of monitoring judges will be lower for the voting rule than
the doctrine. The voting-rule framework demands that each judge state her
beliefs as to the correct statutory interpretation. Lies and deception remain
possible. But the cloaks of statutory ambiguity and second-order judgments
about clarity and reasonableness are no longer available, in contrast to doctrinal
Chevron.
2. Insincere Voting
The question of explicit bargains is closely related to a more interesting
objection, based on the possibility of insincere voting.8" A pocket of literature
has focused on insincere or strategic voting on multi-member courts. 4 The
generic issues are numerous, but for our purposes, the question is strictly
comparative: does voting-rule deference create opportunities for strategic or
insincere voting in a way that the doctrinal deference framework does not?
It is certainly possible that judges might manipulate their votes on sub-
issues in a case to garner or avoid a majority on the outcome. For example, a
judge who hopes to avoid a change in the law from one substantive rule to
another could vote (insincerely) with another minority voting bloc to hold that
the parties do not have standing, thereby avoiding a decision on the merits.S'
But that manipulation is made harder, not easier, by a supermajority voting
rule, as long as the costs of assembling a supermajority on any given issue in a
case are higher than the costs of assembling a simple majority.
That point is subject to an important caveat, however. We must distinguish
unintentional or unconscious bias from intentional manipulation. As to the
83. Cf. Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL.
L. REv. 1309, 1375-77 (1995) (discussing the interaction between strategic voting, stare
decisis, and insincere voting).
84. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999); Colloquium, Appellate Court Voting Rules, 49 VAND. L. REV. 993
(1996); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219
(1994); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
309 (1995).
8S. The issue has parallel application to questions of strategic voting and stare decisis. See
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy of
Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1918-19 (2001).
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former, the shift from soft individual deference to hard aggregate deference
entails risks that individual judges will continue to internalize deference norms.
If so, the system could produce double deference, whereby individual-level
deference would be amplified by the aggregate voting procedures. The
possibility cannot be conceptually eliminated, but we think it relatively
unlikely. The case for aggregate-level deference supposes that judges tend
more naturally toward correct interpretation than permissive interpretation.
Rather than fight this judicial tendency, our theory takes advantage of it. Thus,
while intentional manipulation is possible, unintentional manipulation that
results from ordinary interpretive tendencies is less likely.
As to intentional manipulation, Chevron as a voting rule is relatively easy to
manipulate toward more deference but much harder to manipulate toward less
deference. A dishonest judge who favors deference can intentionally continue
to apply internal deference to agencies' views, resulting in somewhat more
deference than Chevron as a voting rule with sincere de novo voting would
produce. A dishonest judge who opposes deference can always vote against the
agency in either the doctrinal framework or the voting-rule framework; but
whereas deference endures in the aggregate voting-rule world, it may be lost
entirely in the doctrinal world. While injecting more deference is possible,
undermining deference is much harder. In general, while manipulation is of
course possible under Chevron as a voting rule, there is no particular reason to
think that it is systematically easier than under doctrinal Chevron with majority
rule.
3. Mixing Voting Rules
One additional hazard relates to the mixing of supermajority rules and
simple majority rules -either horizontally, within a given case, or vertically,
when lower court decisions are reviewed by higher courts. We have illustrated
the second concern with the case of single-member district courts above.86 To
illustrate the first concern, consider that a supermajority rule might govern
whether an agency interpretation of a statute is lawful, but a simple majority
rule might govern the subsequent question of whether the agency's action was
arbitrary and capricious. (We set aside the view that Step Two of Chevron and
arbitrariness review are functionally identical.8 7) Alternatively, a simple
majority rule might determine the Chevron Step Zero inquiry, while a
86. See supra Section III.B.
87. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned
Decisionmaking in ReviewingAgency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REv. 83 (1994).
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supermajority rule would determine whether to uphold the agency's
interpretation. A perfectly sensible concern is that these sequencing issues
allow for gaming in a way that doctrinal Chevron does not.
If a simple majority rule determines whether to apply the Chevron
framework at Step Zero and a supermajority rule determines the outcome of
the Chevron analysis, then it is possible for a simple majority to vote against
applying the deference framework if the same majority predicts that its
preferred outcome will not win supermajority support. If a majority of Justices
prefers to overturn the agency action, but a supermajority does not, then the
simple majority can avoid the deference framework entirely at Chevron Step
Zero, making an agency loss more likely.
Two points mitigate this concern. First, this type of strategic behavior is
not a problem if a simple majority wants to uphold the agency action. In that
case, a simple majority votes to apply the deference framework at Step Zero,
and the agency action will be upheld because a supermajority of Justices will
not vote against the agency. Second, if we take the question of whether to
apply the deference framework to be guided by Mead, then avoiding the
deference framework is not as easy as it first appears. If the agency used formal
rulemaking, formal adjudication, or informal rulemaking to produce its
judgment, the action will usually qualify for Chevron deference. 88 A majority
could nonetheless vote against applying the deference framework, but in many
cases that would be hard to square with the doctrinal framework. If the agency
failed to use one of the procedural mechanisms favored by Mead, then it is
admittedly far easier for a strategic majority to manipulate away from the
deference framework. But importantly, this is also the case under the current
Chevron regime. A simple majority can vote against applying the Chevron
framework at Step Zero, thereby applying a less deferential standard of review.
The voting rule does no better against this subtle form of manipulation, but it
does not fare worse either.8 9
The sequence of supermajority Chevron voting followed by simple majority
voting on arbitrariness review might produce similar anomalies. We start with
88. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Justice Breyer has suggested that the
Mead framework provides no safe harbors. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2712-13 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
89. A related sequencing issue could arise at the intersection of the grant of certiorari and the
voting rule on the merits. For example, with a Rule of Four and a 6-3 version of Chevron as a
voting rule, four Justices could grant certiorari and then uphold the agency action. Again,
asymmetry supports the deference regime. A sufficient minority could grant certiorari and
uphold the agency action, but it could not grant certiorari and strike down the agency action
in our proposal.
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straightforward scenarios and turn to increasingly difficult ones for our
framework.
(i) Suppose a supermajority ofjustices finds that the agency's interpretation was
wrong. That is the end of the matter; the party challenging the agency's action
has ruled it out altogether as precluded by statute, a greater victory than an
arbitrariness holding that would allow the agency a second chance to justify its
decision. No conflict with arbitrariness review results because arbitrariness
review is unnecessary.
(2) Suppose a supermajority ofJustices agrees with the agency's interpretation. If
a majority of the Justices also concludes that the agency's action was not
arbitrary and capricious, no anomaly results. If a simple majority nonetheless
concludes the action was arbitrary and capricious, there is still no unique
problem or anomaly; the two views are perfectly consistent.
(3) Suppose a simple majority concludes that the agency adopted the correct
interpretation. The agency decision would be authorized; again, it is a separate
question whether a simple majority would also find that the agency adequately
justified its decision in reasoned terms. Whatever the simple majority
concludes on that point, there is no inconsistency with the holding on statutory
authorization.
(4) Lastly, suppose a simple majority concludes that the agency's interpretation of
the statute was incorrect. The agency's decision would stand because of the
supermajority deference rule. But in this case, it is possible that the same
majority would also find the agency action arbitrary and capricious. Given that
the two questions are conceptually distinct -one is about authority to take a
certain action and the other is about adequate justification for that action- here
too it is not obvious that there is any problem. To be sure, a strategic majority
that loses on the statutory question by virtue of the supermajority rule might
bend its views about arbitrariness to compensate. As long as the analysis is
sequential, a simple majority could undermine the aggregate deference rule.
However, under the current framework there is no limit on strategic or
insincere voting during arbitrariness review either. On a split panel, a single
judge might vote insincerely on the statutory interpretation question to reach
or to avoid reaching the arbitrariness question. Again, the Chevron voting rule
does not better this situation, but it does not make it worse, and it should not
be charged with sole responsibility for a bad scenario that can arise under
either the hard or the soft framework. Furthermore, the bad scenario arises
only in a limited subset of cases. Hard and soft rules produce equivalent
outcomes in scenarios (2) and (3). We find scenario (4) unobjectionable, but in
any event, we see no particular reason to think that (4) constitutes the
dominant scenario in the ordinary run of cases. Even if it did, that might be a
reason, not to oppose Chevron as a voting rule, but to advocate a similar shift to
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a supermajority voting rule in the arbitrary and capricious setting, which itself
is supposed to operationalize a deferential standard of review of agency policy
judgments.
All this could create incentives for administrative agencies as well. As best
we can discern, however, any incentive effects would simply mirror the existing
incentive effects created by Mead. If an agency wants to maximize the chance
that Chevron deference will apply, Mead counsels the agency to use formal or
informal rulemaking or formal adjudication- any process other than informal
adjudication. Chevron as a voting rule does so as well because (as explained
above) our proposal does not affect the law of Chevron Step Zero. The agency
might be even more likely to use the procedures favored by Mead under the
voting-rule version of Chevron than under doctrinal Chevron, but only to the
extent that there is greater certainty that deference will in fact result.
Similar dynamics could arise if reviewing courts utilize a simple majority
rule while lower courts use a supermajority rule, or vice versa. The issue can be
cast in any number of ways, but perhaps the cleanest is to focus on Supreme
Court review of three-judge appellate panels. Suppose the D.C. Circuit
adopted a rule requiring a 3-0 vote to overturn an agency's interpretation of a
statute, but the Supreme Court used a simple majority rule to review the
decision. In this world, a simple majority of the Supreme Court could
undermine the supermajority voting rule of the lower court. Given the
relatively low number of circuit judgments that are reviewed by the Court, this
seems unlikely to be a major obstacle to implementation. Alternatively, if the
circuit adopted a supermajority rule and the Supreme Court adopted a
supermajority rule, would we return to the double deference problem noted
above? No; the issue for the Supreme Court's review is whether the Court
should uphold or invalidate the agency's action, not whether the circuit court
properly deferred. The Court owes no deference to lower courts on legal
questions and can apply the Chevron voting rule de novo. That said, we do
endorse the wholesale rather than piecemeal adoption of voting-rule deference,
at all levels of the judicial system.
4. Litigant Effects
Would voting-rule deference change the incentives of regulated parties to
seek judicial review? Specifically, would certain challenges to agency action
currently being brought not be filed in a voting-rule deference regime, or is
there a class of challenges currently not being filed that would suddenly end up
in court? Ultimately, these are thorny empirical questions, but some rough
speculation suggests that any observed effects are likely to be modest and
beneficial overall.
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First, we are not advocating a shift from a legal regime without deference to
a regime with deference. That transition would have significant effects, no
doubt producing fewer challenges to agency actions or at least changing the
mix of litigated cases. The current concern involves a shift from one partial
deference regime to another. For this reason, although some incentive effects
on litigants are likely, it would be surprising if they were of enormous
magnitude.
Second, to the extent that incentive effects would be produced, they are
largely beneficial and derive from the calibration and certainty analysis above.
If voting-rule deference results in more agency decisions being upheld, all else
being equal, we would expect a reduction in the number of challenges brought
(initially) and an increase in the rate of settlement. This effect is either neutral
or positive. If voting-rule deference reduces uncertainty in the litigation lottery,
then that also should encourage more settlement. Agencies and regulated
parties should be able to better predict judicial outcomes and therefore to settle
the case in anticipation of those outcomes. If the actual underlying probability
of victory is held constant, then this reduction of uncertainty or noise in the
judicial process should economize on litigation costs and potentially save both
litigant and agency resources.
We take these effects to be virtually unqualified goods in and of
themselves. But there are potential negative side effects. For example, if
regulated parties are better able to predict that they will lose a challenge to
agency actions, they will be less likely to litigate, which might mean the agency
would (ex ante) enact a more pro-agency rule. That is, we might observe a
different realization of the underlying distribution of potential agency actions.
Given that the goal of Chevron deference is to give more policymaking
authority to agencies, this should not raise hackles; if it is undesirable, the
voting rule can itself be adjusted. In light of the greater ability to calibrate and
recalibrate that the shift to voting rules produces, the incentive effects on
litigants do not seem especially worrisome.
G. Deference and Politics
Even if Chevron as a voting rule performs better than doctrinal deference in
the ways we have emphasized, might doctrinal deference create other positive
externalities that a voting rule would not? To take a straightforward
illustration, doctrinal Chevron asks judges to take seriously the views of
coordinate branches. In the process, maybe doctrinal deference generates
positive norms of respect and appreciation for the views of other governmental
units. Even if such norms are desirable, doctrinal deference seems an expensive
way to accomplish the stated goal. Moreover, it is far from obvious that
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Chevron as a voting rule would not produce more respect for coordinate
branches. Chevron's theory of reasonable or permissible interpretation asks
judges to vote to uphold agency interpretations that they believe to be wrong;
this state of affairs could just as easily generate interbranch hostility as mutual
respect.
Above, we noted some mixed evidence suggesting that even after Chevron a
large degree of ideological bias persists in the litigated cases.9" If limiting the
effect of politics on case outcomes is the goal, then the Chevron doctrine seems
a blunt instrument for accomplishing that task. We have suggested that
Chevron as a voting rule will constrain ideological and political bias in the law
of deference, and at lower cost. If so, then a concern about the political
character of judging in administrative law supports the switch to Chevron as a
voting rule. Perhaps, on some normative views about political theory, it would
be good if administrative law decisions ventilated ideological disagreements.
But because all versions of Chevron assume away such a view, it does not
supply a unique objection to our proposal.
H. Supply-Side Issues
Even if one accepts all the foregoing, there is a separate issue about which
institution(s) can or will supply the change we propose. If a transition from
doctrine to voting rule is simply infeasible, our claim reduces to a theoretically
novel but practically irrelevant suggestion. While the obstacles to
implementation are nontrivial, they are not at all insurmountable.
Contemporaneous practice and historical evidence demonstrate that voting-
rule solutions have been both proposed and adopted, sometimes by legislative
mandate and sometimes by judicial fiat. No feature of the Chevron context
suggests implementation would be harder here than elsewhere, and there are
real reasons to think implementation would be easier. Whereas other proposals
for supermajority voting rules have been associated with efforts to demand
judicial deference against judicial wishes, Congress and the courts apparently
agree that deference to agencies is a desirable goal. Judges, therefore, might be
less resistant to the imposition of Chevron as a voting rule by statute; perhaps
judges might even adopt a voting rule without a congressional dictate.
Before turning to these political concerns, however, we begin with the
potential constitutional, statutory, and doctrinal obstacles to supply of Chevron
as a voting rule by either Congress or the courts. Other scholars have addressed
the parallel question whether Congress or the courts could create a rule of
go. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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deference to legislatures in constitutional adjudication. 9' Compared to that
setting, there are fewer legal obstacles to the adoption of a supermajority
voting rule for the merely statutory cases that Chevron governs.
1. Judicial Supply
The least controversial means for a transition to Chevron as a voting rule
would be for the judiciary to adopt the voting rule itself. Whether or not a
simple majority rule is a default for judicial institutions, there is nothing to
prevent the Supreme Court from adopting an alternative rule. 92 The Court
already relies on nonmajority voting rules to grant certiorari and to hold
cases. 93 Lower courts routinely utilize variants of majority rule in decisions to
grant en banc hearings. Several state supreme courts use supermajority votes to
determine outcomes of state constitutional challenges to legislation, and the
sky has apparently not fallen. 94 Given that Chevron is a doctrine of the Court's
creation, it would clearly be preferable for the Court to spur the transition.
Without Supreme Court intervention, current doctrine likely prevents an
individual circuit from shifting to Chevron as a voting rule. The adoption of our
proposed framework would be facially inconsistent with the current Chevron
model. Any hope for judicial supply thus rests with the Court.
We know of no case in which the Court has adopted a voting-rule approach
to deference for itself or mandated that lower courts utilize one, although we
have also emphasized that the Court does use voting-rule solutions, such as the
Rule of Four, in other contexts. Why does the Court generally eschew hard
solutions to the deference problem? The answer cannot turn on the voting
rule's lack of feasibility, efficiency, or efficacy. On all these fronts, Chevron as a
voting rule performs at least as well, and generally better, than doctrinal
Chevron. Perhaps courts are simply hostile to nonmajority voting rules or hold
some deep belief that voting rules are not a permissible part of the judicial tool
set. But this claim wilts in the face of current judicial use of nonmajority voting
rules to address issues of internal judicial governance, such as en banc review
91. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 8; Shugerman, supra note 8.
92. It is possible, but implausible, to think that the Article III grant of "judicial Power," U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1, contains an implicit mandate for majority voting among Justices or
judges. There is no reason to think that the historical use of majority voting rules in federal
courts (for most matters, but not all) is frozen into a constitutional mandate, so that judges
cannot change those rules when they wish to do so. The bare constitutional references to
"courts" and to "judicial Power" are compatible with many different voting rules.
93. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 11; Revesz & Karlan, supra note lo.
94. See Shugerman, supra note 8, at 954-55.
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and certiorari. These too are deference problems, involving deference to panels
and to colleagues rather than to agencies. On our view, whether the question is
deference to precedent, deference to colleagues, deference to Congress, or
deference to agencies, the underlying problems are similar. Although the right
solution will vary across settings, there is no categorical reason to disfavor hard
solutions in general.
2. Congressional Supply
If the courts elect not to adopt Chevron as a voting rule, Congress could
likely mandate the transition without running afoul of the Constitution.
Congressional authority to mandate supermajority voting rules has been
analyzed most prominently in the context of Thayerian deference to legislative
judgments of constitutionality, either generally or in a specific context such as
federalism.9" Various scholars have suggested that the Necessary and Proper
Clause and the Article III Exceptions Clause provide Congress adequate means
to require that statutes be overturned only by a supermajority. 96 The Necessary
and Proper Clause gives Congress the power to enact legislation for carrying
into execution the judicial power,97 while the Exceptions Clause gives the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction "with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make. '', 8 The academic literature diverges
sharply on the precise powers these Clauses provide to Congress.99 Yet short of
a congressional attempt to direct the outcome of a specific case via voting rule,
there is no strong argument that Congress could not mandate a supermajority
95. See Thayer, supra note 4. For more recent discussions, see Thomas C. Grey, Thayer's
Doctrine: Notes on Its Origin, Scope, and Present Implications, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 28 (1993);
Stephen B. Presser, On Tushnet the Burkean and in Defense of Nostalgia, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 42
(1993); and Mark Tushnet, Thayer's Target: Judicial Review or Democracy?, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 9 (1993). For recent discussions of the supermajority rule in particular, see Caminker,
supra note 8; and Shugerman, supra note 8.
96. See, e.g., Shugerman, supra note 8, at 971-72.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
98. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
99. Compare Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1364 (1953) (suggesting that under the
Exceptions Clause, Congress possesses broad authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, subject to the limitation that it must not destroy the essential role of the
Court), with Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power To Regulate Supreme Court Appellate
Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L.
REV. 900, 907 (1982) (concluding that the Exceptions Clause establishes virtually no
limitations on Congress's power to regulate the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but
admitting the possibility of limitations flowing from other constitutional provisions).
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rule of deference to agencies on questions of statutory interpretation. Congress
generally may not lawfully direct the outcome of a specific case,1°° or reopen a
specific judgment,01 but it is not controversial that (as is necessary and proper)
Congress may determine the number of Justices and judges, set quorum rules
for the courts, or mandate the use of certain rules of evidence and procedure.
2
A voting-rule statute would be similar in form and function to rules of
evidence, procedure, or other potential interpretive statutes. Recent legislation
has even precluded specific interpretations of statutes in live litigation, albeit
with a general interpretive directive.1"3 As long as the regulation does not
undermine the essential functions of the judiciary, Article III provides no
constitutional bar. 104
Perhaps the simplest argument is that congressional power to mandate
Chevron as a voting rule is necessary and proper to the execution of other
legislative powers because a better deference framework could allow Congress
to delegate to agencies at lower cost and with greater precision and
confidence.' °s Either a global deference statute -requiring Chevron as a voting
rule in all cases of agency decisions-or a specific voting rule in an agency's
organic statute would comport with separation of powers principles.1o 6 A
Chevron voting rule would be akin to other interpretive directives that
Congress might lawfully generate,10 7 or indeed to the APA itself, and there is
no inherent constitutional problem with such statutes.
Whatever Congress's general powers to direct voting rules for the federal
judiciary-and we think they are substantial -the argument is all the stronger
100. See United States v. Klein, 8o U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
ioi. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
102. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §5 2071-2077 (2000); see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S.
327 (2000) (upholding automatic stay provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act);
Shugerman, supra note 8.
103. See, e.g., Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
io8-io8, 117 Star. 1241, 1263 (2004) (providing that "nothing in... any other statute, and no
principle of common law, shall be construed or applied to require the Department of the
Interior to commence or continue historical accounting activities with respect to the
Individual Indian Money Trust" until certain conditions had been met, despite a previously
issued injunction to compel such an accounting); Cobell v. Norton, 392 F.3d 461 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (interpreting and applying the Appropriations Act).
104. Cf Hart, supra note 99, at 1365 (describing "the essential role of the Supreme Court in the
constitutional plan").
105. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARv. L. REv.
2085, 2102-03 (2002).
106. See id. at 2103-09 (discussing constitutional objections to legislating interpretive rules).
107. See id.
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in the context of administrative law. With respect to judicial review of agency
actions, Congress may preclude agency actions from judicial review
altogether"°" (at least to the extent that the challenge does not raise
constitutional claims);' 0 9 restrict the venue and timing of judicial review of
agency action; and specify the legal standard by which courts will review
agency action. Against this backdrop, it would be extremely awkward to insist
that Congress is constitutionally prohibited from directing courts to use a
specific voting rule in review of agency actions. If Chevron were a constitutional
doctrine, then there might be a plausible argument that Congress does not
have plenary control. Yet as long as the Court adheres to the view that
Chevron's foundation is congressional intent, Congress is free to modify or
even eliminate Chevron deference via statute. "' The Court has given absolutely
no indication that a statute could not rebut the presumption of deference-for
example, by mandating that courts review agency decisions de novo. We have
already voiced our skepticism about this foundation for Chevron, but as long as
the legal fiction is taken seriously, Congress is free to modify the scope, nature,
intensity, and, as we argue, operative mechanism of the Chevron deference
framework. If Chevron is a creation of fictitious and implicit congressional
intent, we are hard-pressed to see why it may not be modified by real and
express congressional directive.
This is just to say that congressional supply is legally permissible; it is a
separate question whether it is likely. Congress has proven almost mute on the
subject of when courts should defer to administrative agencies. This may show
that the Supreme Court accurately selected the majoritarian default rule in
Chevron: statutory silence evidences congressional satisfaction with the current
soft deference framework. But on this view, congressional silence before 1984
could just as convincingly have signaled support for the rather different pre-
Chevron deference regime. Current congressional silence no more demonstrates
satisfaction with Chevron doctrine than congressional silence before 1984
demonstrated satisfaction with the lack of Chevron doctrine. One possibility is
that the issue of deference simply lacks political salience with constituents and
therefore also lacks payoffs for legislators. 1"' If so, Congress is unlikely to adopt
108. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
iog. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Czerkies v. Dep't of Labor, 73 F-3 d 1435
(7th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
11o. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 1o MICH. L. REV. 2637 (2003).
mii. If true, this fact is disquieting for public choice scholars of the bureaucracy and Congress.
The existence and nature of judicial review should make delegation to agencies significantly
more or less attractive to legislators and regulated private parties. See DAVID EPSTEIN &
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our proposal. But the judicial route remains, and congressional passivity means
that a legislative override of a judicially adopted change would itself be
unlikely.
Additionally, it is worth emphasizing that our proposal does not suffer
from a principal defect of other proposals to implement supermajority voting
rules in the courts. Our proposal is not tied to any congressional efforts to
reduce judicial power or strip jurisdiction. 112 Nor is it related to a contested
institutional fight about if and when courts should show deference to executive
or legislative judgments on any particular policy or in hotly controversial
areas." 3 While Chevron doctrine has received its fair share of criticism in the
commentary, and peripheral questions about the scope and intensity of review
remain, the core doctrine of Chevron deference is now almost universally
embraced by Congress, courts, and agencies. In this sense, our task is quite
different from that of scholars who urge Congress to foist a supermajority
voting rule on the Supreme Court in any federalism case. Surely the proposal
would face some judicial resistance, but we think the nature of the resistance
would be fundamentally different, and its intensity much lower, simply
because the judiciary already holds the view that deference is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
On most questions of law, policy, and fact, Article III courts should defer to
the judgment of administrative agencies. Although we believe the best rationale
for the Chevron doctrine is different from the rationale favored by the current
Court, our proposal is agnostic on this front. Independent of one's view of
Chevron's proper foundation, if deference to administrative agencies is
desirable, then a framework that institutionalizes deference through voting
rules is at least as good as doctrinal deference on virtually every dimension of
comparison and is clearly better on some dimensions.
Rather than impose upon judges the awkward task of developing and
executing a second-order theory of permissible interpretation, the voting-rule
approach asks judges to do what they are trained to do: identify the best
interpretation of a statute. This shift reduces the conceptual, psychological, and
SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO
POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999).
112. Compare the Progressive Era proposals discussed in Caminker, supra note 8, at 75.
113. The supermajority review proposals by Jed Shugerman and Evan Caminker each seek to
impose a supermajority requirement to create deference in a setting where external
observers of the judiciary have found its supposed deference to be inadequate. See sources
cited supra note 8.
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motivational burdens that the Chevron doctrine places on judges. These
burdens are not just benign academic quandaries. They result in confusion and
uncertainty about the manner in which deference will be applied. Confusion of
this sort not only is costly in its own right, but it also helps mask other
potential biases in judicial decisions.
Chevron as a voting rule avoids these problems by making deference an
aggregate rather than individual feature of judicial review. Our analysis
suggests that the hard voting rule is a superior solution to the problem of
partial institutional deference. Although we do not minimize the challenges of
implementation, none seems sufficiently powerful that we should ignore the
benefits from switching to Chevron as a voting rule.
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